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The commercial speech doctrine, the doctrine establishing a subcategory
of protected speech under the First Amendment, has been under
increased fire, most prominently in 2003 with Nike v. Kasky, but also in
other cases around the country covering a variety of contexts. A key
distinguishing attribute of the commercial speech doctrine is that it
permits the government to regulate the speech that it covers for its truth.
This is precisely what the government may not regulate in the area of
political and expressive speech. Many critics would like to see the
commercial speech doctrine done away with altogether. They argue
commercial speech should be treated like political and expressive speech
under the First Amendment. Professor Piety has argued elsewhere that
subjecting commercial speech to the same strict scrutiny as political and
expressive speech would have far reaching negative consequences. In
this Article, Professor Piety addresses a narrower concern: the argument
that (assuming efforts to eliminate it altogether fail) the commercial
speech doctrine’s application should be expressly limited to “traditional
advertising,” excluding corporate speech in the form of public relations.
She proposes that this argument is misplaced because the purposes
articulated by the Supreme Court in establishing the commercial speech
doctrine would be better served by applying it to all marketing-related
speech, including public relations.
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Advertising is publicity that a firm pays for; public relations seek
publicity that does not require payment to the media for time or space.1
Advertising is the continuation of public relations by other means and
should be started only after a PR program has run its course.2

The commercial speech doctrine, the doctrine establishing a subcategory
of protected speech under the First Amendment, has been under increased fire,
most prominently in 2003 with Nike v. Kasky,3 but also in other cases around
the country covering a variety of contexts.4 A key distinguishing attribute of the
commercial speech doctrine is that it permits the government to regulate the
speech that it covers for its truth. This is precisely what the government may
not regulate in the area of political and expressive speech.5 Many critics would
like to see the commercial speech doctrine done away with altogether.6 They
argue commercial speech should be treated like political and expressive speech

1

MICHAEL SCHUDSON, ADVERTISING,
ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 100 (1984).
2

THE UNEASY PERSUASION: ITS DUBIOUS IMPACT

AL RIES & LAURA RIES, THE FALL OF ADVERTISING AND THE RISE OF PR xii (2002).
539 U.S. 654 (2003).
4
United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (First Amendment offered as
a defense to securities fraud); Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(marketers of saw palmetto who claimed on label that it might be beneficial for prostate
condition asserted First Amendment as a defense to FDA action).
5
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271−72 (1964) (First
Amendment may require government to tolerate even false or erroneous speech in some
contexts).
6
See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief for the Advancement of
Capitalism Supporting Petitioners at 3−11, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575)
(arguing for reconsideration and abolishment of commercial speech doctrine). The Center for
the Advancement of Capitalism actually argued for the reinstatement of the Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) standard which would arguably permit even more
regulation of commercial speech than the current doctrine. See infra notes 31–76 and
accompanying text.
3
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under the First Amendment.7 I have argued elsewhere that subjecting
commercial speech to the same strict scrutiny as political and expressive speech
would have far reaching negative consequences.8 Here I address a narrower
concern: the argument that (assuming efforts to eliminate it altogether fail) the
commercial speech doctrine’s application should be expressly limited to
“traditional advertising,” excluding corporate speech in the form of public
relations.9 I propose that this argument is misplaced because the purposes
articulated by the Supreme Court in establishing the commercial speech
doctrine would be better served by applying it to all marketing-related speech,
including public relations.10
The claim that the commercial speech doctrine ought to be confined to
traditional advertising was raised by Nike11 and by many of its amici12 in the
Nike v. Kasky case.13 The argument is that the form of communication should
dictate its treatment under the doctrine.14 Thus, because the disputed
communications in the Nike case were delivered in the form of press releases,
letters to the editor, advertorials, issue ads, and the like, Nike and its amici
argued that the statements contained therein should be treated as political, and
7

See, e.g., Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the Running-But-Going-Nowhere
Commercial Speech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 383 (2005); Deborah J. La Fetra, Kick It
Up A Notch: First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1205 (2004); Comment, Free Speech Protections for Corporations: Competing in the
Markets of Commerce and Ideas, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2272 (2004).
8
Tamara R. Piety, Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike’s Quest for a Constitutional Right
to Lie, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 151, 188−99 (2005) [hereinafter Piety, Grounding Nike]. Nor do I
attempt to address here the more complicated issue of corporate speech−that is, speech by a
corporation in non-marketing contexts. That too I have addressed elsewhere. Tamara R.
Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression: Some Reflections on Existing and
Potential Costs (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Piety,
Against Freedom of Commercial Expression]. See also R. George Wright, Freedom and
Culture: Why We Should Not Buy Commercial Speech, 72 DEN. U. L. REV. 137 (1994).
9
See, e.g., Bruce E.H. Johnson & Jeffrey L. Fisher, Why Format, Not Content, Is The
Key to Identifying Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1243 (2004).
10
At present it is not clear what the doctrine covers. That the public relations and
marketing industry experts still believe it could go either way—that is, full protection or
fully commercial—is illustrated by the following article appearing recently in the Journal of
Advertising. Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, The Legal Challenge of Integrated Marketing
Communication (IMC): Integrating Commercial and Political Speech, 34 J. ADVERTISING,
93 (2005).
11
See Brief for Petitioners at 22−24, Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575) (arguing
that California decision “expands” the definition of commercial speech).
12
See, e.g., Brief for the Bus. Roundtable as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
13, Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575) (state interest in regulating speech is “strong and
legitimate” with respect to traditional advertising); Brief for Exxonmobil et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16, Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575) (“Only when a
corporation’s statements are presented as a part of a corporation’s selling message in a
product advertisement or a product label can the government’s interest in preventing
‘commercial harms’ arguably justify a degree of regulation not permitted for speech by other
speakers.”).
13
539 U.S. 654 (2003).
14
See also Johnson & Fisher, supra note 9.
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thus fully protected, speech. Central to this argument was a characterization of
Nike as a “speaker” with speech “rights.” This was a powerful rhetorical
device; one that many observers found persuasive.15 However, the power of
this metaphor of the corporation as a “person” with “speech rights” tends to
obscure the degree to which statements made to the press through the vehicle of
public relations are an integral part of most corporations’ marketing plans.16
They aren’t “opinions” or expression as we normally think of them–at least not
for the corporation. They are marketing. Moreover, even the most cursory study
of current marketing practices reveals that issues such as labor and
environmental practices are considered integral parts of the corporate image
and thus relevant to marketing the firm by those who market it. Speech on these
topics is always of commercial interest to the firm making it. That is its
primary, perhaps only, legitimate interest given the duty to shareholders. 17
As noted, many have argued that the commercial speech doctrine, which
permits more governmental regulation of speech deemed “commercial” than of
speech deemed “political,” ought only to apply to speech issued in a
“traditional product advertising” format.18 Apart from the difficulties of clearly
defining “traditional product advertising” format, this argument isn’t supported
by a close review of the Supreme Court’s cases. Although in some cases the
Court implies that commercial speech is advertising, thus lending some support
for the position (if only tangentially) in fact the Court has not clearly defined
what constitutes “commercial speech,” let alone what “traditional advertising
format” might be. And in other cases, the Court has rejected the proposition
that all advertising, traditional or otherwise, equals “commercial speech” or that
the mere linkage of advertising to an issue of public concern will convert
commercial speech to fully protected political speech.19

15
Moreover, it finds support in some of the Court’s decisions which treat corporations
as speakers with rights. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 530 (1980); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). But see
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (retreating from the strong
stance of corporate speaker as indistinguishable from individual speaker).
16
On the power of metaphor see Steven L. Winter, Death is the Mother of Metaphor,
105 HARV. L. REV. 745, 753−57 (1992); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense,
Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989);
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 1371 (1988).
17
Indeed, some in the pro-Nike camp admitted as much. “[B]ecause corporations are
entities whose decision makers owe fiduciary duties to shareholders and owners, no
responsible corporate spokesman speaks on a company’s behalf without being concerned
about the effects the statements may have on corporate sales and profits.” Brief for Arthur
W. Page Soc’y et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18−19, Nike, Inc., 539 U.S.
654 (No. 02-575) (emphasis added). I argue, in Against Freedom of Commercial Expression,
that is the only legitimate interest for commercial expression under current principles of
corporate governance. See supra note 8. See also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech:
Why Corporate Speech is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995 (1998).
18
See, e.g., Brief for Forty Leading Newspapers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 3, Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575).
19
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66−69 (1983).
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Given that much traditional advertising makes few, if any, explicit claims,
limiting the commercial speech doctrine to traditional product advertising
would potentially leave the government presiding over an increasingly empty
set—that is, free to regulate “advertising,” but only as to explicit claims in a
context where few explicit claims are made and powerless to regulate nonproduct advertising marketing speech, a context where many explicit claims
may be made. Many of the claims the government has an interest in
regulating—false health, safety, and environmental claims by for-profit
corporations—are made in the context of marketing efforts outside of
traditional advertising, such as in press releases which attempt to position these
marketing claims as “news.” Moreover, “the market” that advertisers are
concerned with is made up of not just “consumers,” but also investors,
reporters, banks, employees, stockholders, and many others.20
I argue here that the Court should clearly state that the term “commercial
speech” broadly encompasses all speech that could be characterized as
marketing or related to for-profit corporate self-promotion. In other words I
propose the following formula: public relations = marketing = commercial
speech, absent some factual circumstances that might suggest a different
treatment. This proposal is premised on Professor Steven Shiffrin’s argument21
that there is no single value or theory animating the First Amendment and that
the most promising approach to the issues that implicate it is a nuanced, multifactor approach. I hope in this Article to offer some of the concrete examples of
why, consistent with the theory for protection of commercial speech,
“commercial speech” should be interpreted broadly to include many statements
made in the context of public relations because such statements’ primary, if not
exclusive aim, is a marketing aim. Such statements are aimed at making a
contribution to public discussion.
Part I reviews the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.22 case, which established the commercial speech
doctrine and reviews the justifications offered therein for its creation. These
justifications suggest that the interests the Court meant to protect in the early
articulation of the doctrine are equally implicated by marketing in the form of
public relations.23 The foundational and controlling case law demonstrates that
20

Of course many of these groups include consumers since the categories are not
hermetically sealed.
21
Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983). See also J.M.
Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment,
1990 DUKE L.J. 375 (1990).
22
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
23
What is not discussed in this Article is whether the strong version of commercial
speech, the version that equates corporate speech with commercial speech, and which
employs the metaphor of corporation as “speaker” with speech “rights” can be squared with
theories of what the First Amendment is meant to protect. I am not certain that it can. I
address this question in a separate article and suggest that the commercial speech doctrine
perhaps represents a wrong turn in the interpretation of the First Amendment. See Piety,
Grounding Nike, supra note 8. This Article does not challenge the commercial speech
doctrine per se and presumes the legitimacy of the interests expressed by the Court in
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the Court constructed the commercial speech doctrine primarily for the
protection of the consumer and to promote the efficient operation of the market
by providing for protection of truthful commercial speech and limiting the
government’s ability to paternalistically suppress or regulate such truthful
speech on the alleged grounds of consumer welfare. The Court reasoned that
advertising contained information that, if truthful, the government should
ordinarily not suppress, absent fairly compelling circumstances.24 Consumers
should be trusted with the truth and the market’s efficient operation depends on
information. But for precisely the same reasons, the Court retained the
government’s power to regulate such speech for its truth and to suppress, or
(more accurately) to provide sanctions for untruthful or misleading speech. The
subsequent sections illustrate that these interests are also implicated by speech
that takes the form of public relations and thus that such speech ought to be
considered at least presumptively “commercial” unless proven otherwise.
Part II of the Article addresses the question of advertising’s alleged
informational function. The Supreme Court has at times appeared to use the
terms “advertising” and “commercial speech” as if they were synonymous and
yet in other contexts clearly indicated that they are not synonymous. This
section argues that the two terms are not synonyms. Advertising is a subset of
marketing. And while advertising has some informational function, its principal
function is to sell and it need not provide much information to do so. In this it
overlaps with other kinds of marketing speech that also contain some
information. Indeed, pursuant to industry practice, there is often more
information outside of advertising than in it. The Court’s assumption that
advertising’s function is primarily informational bears little resemblance to the
observable practice. Nor does it track the understanding drawn from marketing
professionals and academics as to how they understand advertising and how it
fits generally into a marketing plan. In their view advertising is only one part of
an overall marketing program in which important information may be conveyed
through marketing devices other than the traditional product advertising or the
use of traditional advertising format. A key part of this plan is the development
of brand identity. And brand identity is maintained through several devices—
advertising is only one of those devices..

establishing the doctrine so as to provide a starting point for analyzing whether those
interests are also served by treating public relations speech as commercial speech. Again, I
am not suggesting that there is a single value that the First Amendment can be said to
protect. See Shriffin, supra note 21, and Balkin, supra note 20. See also Steven L. Winter,
Fast Food and False Friends in the Shopping Mall of Ideas, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 965
(1993).
24
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770−73. (observing that while the
government may not protect the public from truthful information about legal activity, the
government may retain the right to regulate the form, time, place and manner, ads about
illegal activity, and provide special rules for the media). See also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (articulating the still
applicable 4-part test: speech must (1) concern a lawful activity, (2) not be misleading, (3)
the regulation must directly advance the government’s interest, and (4) do so no more than
necessary to accomplish objectives).
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Part III discusses the issue of brand identity as an amalgam of several
factors which involve not only issues regarding the qualities of the products or
services, but also about the processes that generate those products and services.
Increasingly it is the case that consumers are interested in channeling their
consumption25 to certain types of companies or companies that engage in, or
refrain from, certain practices. For example, in the 2005 Christmas season,
some religious groups urged doing business only with companies that explicitly
referred to “Christmas” rather than to “holiday” in their advertising and
promotional displays.26 Some consumers are interested in whether a
manufacturer is “sweatshop free” or whether it conducts manufacturing in
environmentally sound ways or produces a product that is not harmful to the
environment.27 For decades many consumers have been interested in “buying
American” and seek assurances that a product is “Made in the U.S.A.” Drawing
on the work of Professor Douglas Kysar and using his terminology, I argue that
these “preferences for process” are as legitimate an expression of consumer
interest as color, quality, price, and other conventional loci of consumer
interests.28
However, without accurate and reliable information on issues such as
environmental, labor, animal testing, and other practices, consumers are unable
to use their purchasing “vote” to reflect their interests and preferences in these
areas. And in the absence of negative consequences for false statements, some
sellers can free-ride on the efforts of others—that is, benefit from identifying
their products as “cruelty-free” without actually incurring the costs of making
the production changes that would warrant such a designation. It is significant
to the issue of negative consequences that often much of the information about
environmental, labor, animal testing, and other such practices is conveyed
through public relations mechanisms such as press releases, advertorials,
interviews, editorial comments, web page commentary and the like. Delivered
in this form, the speech appears to some observers as protected speech. But to
its practitioners it is (when it works) just free advertising.
Part IV explores the practice of public relations—the source of that “free
advertising.” Here I examine the foundations of the profession. The key point
that emerges in this section is that public relations speech is a form of
marketing which gains credibility and effectiveness because of its delivery
through a third party—the media. Although it need not be so, it has often been
the case that the various media outlets have been fairly uncritical of “news”
coming from interested sources and shown a perhaps distressing willingness to
“report” information obtained through a company’s press officer without
25

Actually it is not just consumption activities, but also investing. See Cynthia L.
Cooper, Religious Right Discovers Investment Activism, CORPWATCH, Aug. 3, 2005,
http://www.corpwatch.org/print_article.php?id=12527.
26
Adam Cohen, Op-Ed., This Season’s War Cry: Commercialize Christmas, or Else,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, § 4, at 11.
27
Samar Farah, The Thin Green Line, CMO MAG., Dec. 2005, available at
http://www.cmomagazine.com/read/120105/green_line.html?action=print.
28
See also Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of the United
States Congress at 10−14, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
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attribution or independent verification of the facts.29 When a newspaper carries
a company’s “message” it is better than any advertising because it is both free
and more credible to the public than it would be coming directly from the
company. And, for the reasons explored in the previous sections, many of those
“messages” involve the company’s labor, environmental, and other process
practices that relate to its image, reputation, and personality—all of which are
directly relevant to sales. Such claims are more likely to be covered as “news”
than simple product descriptions, but they nevertheless contribute to the bottom
line. Moreover, many of the explicit claims that the government may have an
interest in regulating as a matter of consumer and environmental protection are
made in the context of public relations initiatives.
In Part IV, I offer two case studies indicating why the statements made in
the public relations context are as relevant, if not more so, to the quality of
information in the market and to consumer protection, the reasons commercial
speech was protected in the first place, as any statements made in the traditional
product advertising context. To illustrate this claim I take two specific
examples: the role played by publicity in Enron and the role played by public
relations with respect to information on the impact of cigarette smoking on
public health as documented in the recent tobacco litigation brought by the
United States. These examples are only a few of many that illustrate that public
health and welfare may depend upon the government’s ability to regulate the
quality of information in the market and to provide appropriate sanctions for
false and misleading information.30
29
JOHN C. STAUBER & SHELDON RAMPTON, TOXIC SLUDGE IS GOOD FOR YOU: LIES,
DAMN LIES AND THE PUBLIC RELATIONS INDUSTRY 179−96 (1995) (chapter entitled All The
News That is Fit to Print, describing interpenetration of news and public relations
professions, heavy reliance of journalists on public relations news releases, manipulation of
journalists, etc.). See also Diane Farsetta & Daniel Price, Center for Media and Democracy,
Fake TV News: Widespread and Undisclosed, Apr. 6, 2006 available at
http://www.prwatch.org/node/4550/ (report of 10 month nationwide study of the undisclosed
use of video news releases (VNR)). This practice also undermines the argument made by the
media amici in Nike that there is no need to provide liability for false statements made in this
context because the public can rely on the media to ferret out the deception. See Brief for
Forty Leading Newspapers et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 18, at 22−26 (media coverage
of Nike demonstrates that regulation is unnecessary). For a discussion of a distinct, but
related, source of distortion in the press—the threat of withdrawal of advertising on the basis
of content—see Byron Calame, Op-Ed., Cracks in the Wall Between Advertising and News,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005, § 4, at 12. This problem is also discussed in, among others,
ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY 56−57 (1999) (“[I]n 1997 the
Wall St. Journal reported that some major national advertisers demanded to know the
contents of specific issues of magazines before they would agree to place ads in them.”). C.
EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 44−70 (1994) (chapter 11,
Advertising and the Content of a Democratic Press, describing commercial pressure to shape
content). This second source of concern is not the subject of this Article. But its existence
further undermines the suggestion that concerns for “balance” and airing all views require
offering First Amendment protection to commercial entities’ marketing efforts that appear as
editorial content.
30
All sides in this debate may be guilty of not making explicit the perhaps significant
difference between regulation in the form of suppression and regulation in the form of
permissible sanctions for violations of the prohibition on false statements of fact. Although
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Finally, in Part V, I propose a test for distinguishing between protected
speech and commercial speech in the context of public relations statements.
The test is meant to be a starting point for a more Realist approach to the
assessment of commercial speech under the First Amendment and builds on the
existing test articulated by the California Supreme Court in Kasky v. Nike, Inc.
This is only meant as a starting point for analysis and undoubtedly does not
mean there will be no difficult cases. But the alternative that the proponents of
expanded commercial speech propose, full First Amendment protection for
everything but traditional product advertising, would mean losing significant
control over speech with important economic, public health, and welfare
implications.
I.

COMMERCIAL SPEECH

The commercial speech doctrine is a controversial subsection of that
speech considered protected by the First Amendment.31 The commercial speech
doctrine protects truthful, not misleading, commercial speech, while making
explicit the government’s power to regulate commercial speech within the
guidelines set out in the doctrine. The doctrine entails virtually unlimited ability
to regulate untruthful or misleading speech, while providing limitations on the
government’s ability to regulate truthful commercial speech. Prior to the
creation of the commercial speech doctrine, most observers and the Court
appeared to believe that the government had unlimited ability to regulate any
commercial speech. So the limitations on the ability to regulate commercial
speech, of heightened scrutiny of fit and purpose, as set forth in the still
controlling case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York,32 represented an expansion of the scope of the First
Amendment to areas not previously covered by it. The question is: What were
the grounds for that expansion?

there is much academic disagreement about the validity of the distinction, see JOHN H.
GARVEY & FREDRICK SCHAUER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER 309−10 (2d ed. 1996)
(collecting articles), doctrinally the Court continues to assert that there are important
distinctions between the two. “[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.” Tory v. Cochran,
125 S.Ct. 2108, 2111 (2005) (quoting Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559
(1976)). Also, with respect to the varieties of ways to police false advertising, there is some
evidence that private enforcement actions authorized by law may be more effective than
regulatory agencies. Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of
Public Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REV. 1, 71
(1985).
31
It is axiomatic that much speech is not covered by the First Amendment at all, even
though proponents of First Amendment “absolutism” tend to overlook this point. See
Frederick Schauer, Categories and The First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 265, 273 (1981).
32
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
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A. The Listeners’ Rights

The commercial speech doctrine was developed in the context of a claim
by a consumer group that the government ought not to have the power to
suppress truthful information about products.33 The truthful information in
question was price and the product was prescription drugs. The State of
Virginia argued that the publication of drug prices would result in price wars
that would ultimately lead to an undesirable decline in professionalism by
pharmacists. The Virginia Citizens Council argued that the State’s justification
for suppression of price information was unduly paternalistic. In a free society,
it argued, consumers ought to be able to make up their own minds about their
purchases with full information about the product, including the price. The
Supreme Court agreed. The Court wrote, “the State’s protectiveness of its
citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in
ignorance.”34 “It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available,
that the First Amendment makes for us.”35 The State, it noted, may not advance
its goals of protecting the citizenry “by keeping the public in ignorance of the
entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering.”36
The interest in accurate information, the Court observed, could have very
concrete consequences for individuals. Indeed, this was particularly true in the
context of prescription medications since the availability of a given drug at a
particular price could make the difference between whether the consumer could
purchase it and thus make a difference to human health and well being. The
Court observed that, “[a]s to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow
of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far,
than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”37 This analysis
focused on the listeners’ right to receive information, rather than on the
speaker’s interest in transmitting it, or on any notion of expressive rights in the
speaker.
As the Court noted, the case did not involve any claim for the pharmacists
who would be “directly subject to” the statutory prohibition (such a claim had
been earlier struck down by a Virginia appellate court), but rather it involved
consumers interested in receiving the price information.38 The threshold
question, according to the Court, was whether, even assuming that
constitutional protection could be extended to the publication of drug prices,
33
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976) (characterizing Virginia’s argument in favor of the price ban as “highly
paternalistic”). See also Alan B. Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine:
An Originalist’s Recollection, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1189 (2004) (article by one of the
attorneys who argued the Virginia Pharmacy case describing the context in which the
prevailing argument was developed).
34
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769.
35
Id. at 770.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
38
Id. at 753.
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the recipients of that information had standing to advance the claim. The Court
concluded that its case law on the subject provided that “freedom of speech
‘necessarily protects the right to receive’” as well as to disseminate
information.39 “If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to
receive the advertising . . . .”40 But this formulation required the Court to first
find a right to advertise, something which it had, up to that point, declined to
do.
For example, in 1942, in Valentine v. Chrestensen,41 the Court rejected the
proposition that the First Amendment protected “purely commercial
advertising.”42 But by 1973, the Court, while not directly addressing the issue
of protection for advertising per se, had upheld an ordinance that prohibited
newspapers from printing want ads for employment segregated by gender on
the grounds that because the segregation of want ads into gendered categories
was illegal, the government was constitutionally free to prohibit such speech.43
Then, two years later, in Bigelow v. Virginia,44 the Court concluded that
the First Amendment protected the publication in Virginia of advertising of the
availability of abortion services in New York, even though those services were
illegal in Virginia and a Virginia statute “made the circulation of any
publication to encourage or promote the processing of an abortion in Virginia a
misdemeanor.”45 In Bigelow, the Court announced that the holding in Valentine
v. Chrestensen was “distinctly a limited one.”46 However, because the Court
found the abortion ads did more than “simply propose a commercial
transaction,” it held the ads were protected. 47 As a result, the Virginia
Pharmacy Court later concluded that the question of whether strictly
commercial speech might be entitled to any First Amendment protection had
not been raised in Bigelow.48 Finding the question “squarely before us” for the
first time since Valentine, the Virginia Pharmacy Court concluded that there
was some limited First Amendment protection for speech that “does ‘no more
than propose a commercial transaction.’”49 It observed that the fact that money
was paid for its dissemination and that the “advertiser’s interest [was] a purely
economic one” “hardly disqualif[ied] him from protection under the First
Amendment.”50
39

added).
40
41
42
43

(1973).
44

Id. at 757 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762−63 (1972)) (emphasis
Id. at 757.
316 U.S. 52 (1942).
Id. at 54.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376

421 U.S. 809 (1975).
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759−60.
46
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 819.
47
Id. at 822.
48
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760−61.
49
Id. at 761−62 quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relation Comm’n., 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973).
50
Id. at 762.
45
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In fact, the Court noted, parties to a labor dispute had primarily economic
interests with which they were concerned. Yet the protection of the First
Amendment to labor disputants did not require them to address “unionism in
general.”51 Rather, the Court found, their individual economic interests in the
dispute at hand were of significance because “‘the practices in a single factory
may have economic repercussions upon a whole region and affect widespread
systems of marketing.’”52 “Since the fate of such a ‘single factory’ could as
well turn on its ability to advertise its product as on the resolution of its labor
difficulties, we see no satisfactory distinction between the two kinds of
speech.”53 The Court took this observation and segued into a discussion in
which the principal justifications offered to protect some commercial speech
had almost everything to do with the listeners, in particular the public at large,
and little to do with the speakers.
B. The Need for Accurate Information in the Operation of a Free Market

Thus, to the “keen interest” of the specific consumers before the Court
were added the interests of the public at large. “[S]ociety also may have a
strong interest in the free flow of commercial information.”54
So long as we preserve a predominately free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that
those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To
this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. And if
it is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise
system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as
to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the
First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten
public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free
flow of information does not serve that goal. 55
This observation focuses on the public interest in the efficient functioning of
the economy, not on anyone’s “rights” to speak. According to the Court, it is in
the public interest for there to be a free flow of accurate information because
such a free flow of accurate information is necessary in order for the economy
to function properly. In the traditional rights analysis to which First
Amendment rights are often subject, rights are not described as protected for
solely instrumental reasons, that is, because they further some other goal, even
though protection may in fact further those other goals. Rather, they are

51

Id.
Id. at 763 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940)) (emphasis added).
53
Id. (emphasis added). Note that the Court did not say that the only basis for
extending protection to speech in labor disputes was the significance of that dispute to the
larger world; but it did imply that it was the justification with the most relevance to the
current dispute before the Court.
54
Id. at 764.
55
Id. at 765 (emphasis added) (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
52

LCB10.2_PIETY.DOC

2006]

5/17/2006 4:50:09 PM

FREE ADVERTISING & COMMERCIAL SPEECH

379

protected as intrinsically valuable components of human dignity or autonomy.56
However, the Virginia Pharmacy justification for protection of commercial
speech is almost exclusively instrumental. It protects the dissemination of
information, not for its own sake, but because of the good that is said to flow
from it.
The key premise on which this judgment rests is that that in order for the
public to be assisted by the information, it must be accurate. Thus, the state
remained free to regulate speech that was false or misleading. “The First
Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State from insuring
that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.”57 It is
rather hard to imagine that the Court would find the proposition that the
dissemination of false information was “indispensable” to the functioning of
the economy, even if there are some empirical reasons to suppose this might be
true.58 So then the articulation of the commercial speech doctrine begins with
the proposition that its protections extend only to truthful speech. “Untruthful
speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”59
Moreover, the Court found that it was consistent with this principle to regulate
even speech that wasn’t, strictly speaking, “untruthful” if it merely had the
potential to be “deceptive or misleading.”60
This statement of purpose was reiterated in Central Hudson,61 the case that
remains the controlling test for regulation challenged under the commercial
speech doctrine.62 In Central Hudson the Court reiterated that, “[t]he First
Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational
function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection
to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the

56
See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 880 (1963) (“The theory asserts that freedom of expression, while not the
sole or sufficient end of society, is a good in itself, or at least an essential element in a good
society.”); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405,
1413−14 (1986) (describing classic liberalism’s identification of autonomy in what he calls
the Free Speech Tradition, with freedom from interference by the government). The question
of whose autonomy is protected by dominant interpretations of the First Amendment is
forcefully raised by Professor Catharine MacKinnon. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 206−13 (1987).
57
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771−72 (emphasis added).
58
False statements may in fact generate sales. They may even generate more sales than
truthful statements as long as people want desperately enough to believe the claims to be
true. To the extent the economy is fairly dependent upon a high level of consumption and
any decline in consumption is met with alarm, it may be the case that if a fair amount of that
consumption is generated by false claims, then even false claims could be said to be
“indispensable.” There may be evidence for that proposition. But exploring it is beyond the
scope of this Article.
59
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 (emphasis added).
60
Id.
61
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
62
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (observing that Central
Hudson was the controlling test in the commercial speech area).
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public about lawful activity.”63 Thus, the test as set forth in the Central Hudson
case begins with the requirement that the speech in question “concern lawful
activity and not be misleading.”64
But if much of the information on which consumers (and other persons
who may affect the economy such as analysts, investors, business persons, and
the like) depend is disseminated as public relations speech, then presumably
there is an equally strong justification for regulating this speech on the very
same grounds—the proper functioning of the market—that justified the
protection for price advertising in Virginia Pharmacy. Indeed, this intuition is
supported by the key role that information plays in securities regulation and
corporate governance generally. From decisions about whether a board of
directors’ actions can receive the protection of the business judgment rule,65 to
the adequacy of proxy solicitations in shareholder votes,66 to the ratification of
potential conflicts of interest67—in virtually every area of corporate law,
adequate disclosure is key to protection from liability.68 Presumably this is
because disclosure is seen as essential to proper market function. It is not
“disclosure” if it isn’t true.
It remains then to be explored the source of this alleged distinction
between “traditional advertising” and public relations when dealing with
commercial speech. It is a key premise of this Article that the distinction cannot
be maintained because all of the speech of a for-profit corporation is,
ultimately, marketing speech. I suggest it was a wrong turn taken in cases such
as First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti69 and Consolidated Edison Co. of
New York v. Public Service Commission of New York,70 cases in which the
63

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563 (emphasis added).
Id. at 566. The remaining prongs of the 4-part test are that: (2) the government’s
asserted interest in regulating the speech be “substantial;” (3) that the regulation in question
“directly advances” said interest; and that (4) it does so without being “more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest.”
65
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(B) (focusing on a director’s obligation to be
well or adequately informed in order to have the benefit of the business judgment rule).
66
See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (“The purpose of § 14(a)
[of the Securities Exchange Act] is to prevent management or others from obtaining
authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy
solicitation.”).
67
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144(a)(1)–(2) (1974).
68
The focus on the truthfulness in this context raises specters for some of governmental
“arbitrators of truthfulness.” Brief for the ACLU & the ACLU of Northern California as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
However, this concern obscures the fact that much of the judicial enterprise is directed at
determining the “truth”–factual and legal–in innumerable situations, an enterprise fraught
with difficulties given the fallibility of human reasoning processes and the limitations of the
ability to know the truth of a past event. See, e.g., TERENCE ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING,
ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE 96−104 (1998) (describing the Rationalist Tradition under which the
judicial system proceeds as if such truths are ascertainable). Unless one is prepared to
abandon the judicial system wholesale, it must be admitted that the law acts as an arbiter of
truth in many areas, certainly with respect to concrete factual claims..
69
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
70
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
64
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Court found a right for corporations to speak about matters of public concern,
that raised the prospect, attractive to for-profit corporations, that all speech by
the corporation could or should arguably be deemed protected because the right
as analyzed in these cases appeared to reside in the corporation, not in the
public.
Because corporations have no “opinion” about matters of public concern,
apart from their impact on the economic affairs of the corporation—it was
inevitable that these two categories would collide. As previously noted, the
broader argument that for-profit corporations ought to have no “rights” at all to
speech is dealt with in another paper.71 Here I will assume that a distinction can
be made between a general statement on a matter of public concern, such as the
statement about the state income tax referendum in Bellotti, where there is no
obvious connection between the statement and the corporation’s welfare, and
statements, like those in the Nike case that have a clear connection to the
corporation’s economic interest or operations, such as a factual statement
concerning whether it pays minimum wage, even though in both cases the only
real justification for the expenditure pursuant to principles of corporate
governance can be that it advanced the company’s economic interests in some
manner. It is the latter type of communication, speech that directly implicates
the company specifically—its products, its practices, its policies—that arguably
constitutes “commercial speech”—even if it is issued in a public relations
format.
C. Definitional Difficulties

The term “commercial speech” has never been very satisfactorily defined
so that it can be established that the Central Hudson test, as opposed to some
other test, or no test at all, is applicable to a particular instance of speech. One
of the problems, and the principal source of controversy, is the difficulty of
defining “commercial speech.” What is commercial speech? Throughout its
relatively short lifetime “commercial speech” has been dogged by much the
same definitional ambiguity as has marked the question of pornography. The
Court, both in its early rejection of First Amendment protection for commercial
speech72 and in its later announcement of limited protection in the Virginia
Pharmacy73 case, seemed untroubled by any definitional ambiguity. And
although the doctrine has survived many assaults on it, both in case law and in
academic and other writing, it has been controversial and the controversy has
escalated over time.
As Professor David Vladeck has observed, “[f]ew of the early commercial
speech cases were unanimous.”74 The attempts to formulate a standard that
71

See Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, supra note 8.
See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
73
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
74
David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1052−53 (2004).
72
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would reflect broad consensus have been unsuccessful even though, as yet, the
Central Hudson case still stands. But the analysis has moved from a standard
that was rather deferential to governmental claims for a power to regulate, to
one that is closer to strict scrutiny.75 “The Central Hudson test the Court now
employs is a demanding one—a standard so rigorous that it results in virtually
automatic invalidation of laws restraining truthful commercial speech.”76 Still,
many commercial interests are not satisfied by this more rigorous doctrine and
would like to sweep it away altogether or, failing that, to restrict the doctrine
even more narrowly to “traditional advertising.” An analysis of modern
marketing vividly illustrates what interests are at stake in this request. But it
also illustrates what might be a basis for claiming a legitimate governmental
interest in regulating public relations speech as well as traditional advertising,
that is, a return to the foundational concern—the role of accurate information in
the proper functioning of the economy. I begin with an analysis of “traditional
advertising.”
II. WHAT IS “ADVERTISING”?
Ad·ver·tis·ing (ăd′vər-tī′zĭng) n. 1. The act of calling public attention to a
product or business.77

According to a leading educational text, advertising is: “A form of either
mass communication or direct-to-consumer communication that is nonpersonal and is paid for by various business firms, nonprofit organizations, and
individuals who are in some way identified in the advertising message and who
hope to inform or persuade members of a particular audience.”78 In a chapter
entitled “Traditional Advertising Media,” the book identifies the vehicles for
traditional advertising as out-of-home (billboards, etc.) advertising, newspaper,
magazine, radio, and television advertising.79
But promotion or marketing of a firm’s products or services is not
confined to these traditional vehicles. Hence the term, “integrated marketing
communications” or IMC.80 Marketing communications take place in the form
of in-store displays, direct mail campaigns, product placement in movies and
television, promotional tie-ins with movies and television, event sponsorship,
issue sponsorship, email, give-aways, contests, word-of-mouth campaigns—in
short, the only limitation for form appears to be the imagination of the
75

Id. at 1055−59.
Id. at 1059.
77
WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 81 (1984) (all fonts and
typeface, excepting italics, in original).
78
TERENCE A. SHIMP, ADVERTISING, PROMOTION, & SUPPLEMENTAL ASPECTS OF
INTEGRATED MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS 621 (6th ed. 2003).
79
Id. at 354−81. Presumably, although the vehicle is non-traditional, Internet
advertising would also be “traditional” in the sense of its content.
80
Id. See also Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, The Legal Challenge of Integrated Marketing
Communications (IMC): Integrating Commercial and Political Speech, 34 J. ADVERTISING
93 (2005).
76
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marketer. In the quoted textbook, the author notes, “we use marketing
communications to refer to the collection of advertising, sales promotions,
public relations, event marketing, and other communication devices . . ..”81
Some of these forms may explicitly “propose a commercial transaction,”82
others may only imply it or be intended to create positive associations with the
brand.83 It is unclear how the proponents of a limitation to traditional product
advertising would deal with this proliferation. The Court has also not been
clear.
The United States Supreme Court has never really precisely defined
“advertising.” But it has often used the term as if it were coextensive with
“commercial speech,” that is, as if all “advertising” = “commercial speech.”84
Obviously this is not the case since some advertisements—such as the one
involved in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan85—are treated as political speech.
The speech in Sullivan was an “ad” in that it was space purchased from the
newspaper by an outside party. But it did not involve the promotion of, or
information about, any product. Rather it was a plea for donations for the
assistance of Martin Luther King and other civil rights demonstrators in the
South.86 This “ad” was thus appropriately treated not as product advertising but
as political speech.87
It is also not the case, much as some observers would like to argue that it
should be, that as a doctrinal matter, all “commercial speech” = “advertising,”
at least as that term is traditionally understood. As the Court has previously
noted, even materials which do include some discussion of matters of public
concern, and thus are not limited to traditional product advertising, can be
deemed “commercial speech.”88 “We have made clear that advertising which
‘links a product to a current public debate’ is not thereby entitled to
constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech.”89 However, the
Court has fairly consistently assumed that advertising equaled information and
that information had some impact on consumer behavior. Both of these
assumptions are actually fairly problematic and will be explored in more detail
81

SHIMP, supra note 78, at 3 (emphasis in original).
This definition was proposed in the Virginia Pharmacy case. Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
83
Of course sometimes a name can become associated in the public mind with
something negative and call up negative associations. See Note, Badwill, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1845 (2003) (discussing issue of, when a trademark or trade name becomes associated with
negative information, whether it ought to be able to change its name). Phillip Morris and its
affiliates changed their name to Altria, apparently in the hopes of disassociating the company
from the negative connotations related to Phillip Morris and tobacco.
http://www.altria.com/about_altria/1_0_AboutAltriaOver.asp (last visited on Feb. 5, 2006).
84
Virginia Pharmacy is itself an example of this since its discussion uses the terms
“commercial speech” and “advertising” as if they referred to the same thing.
85
376 U.S. 254.
86
Id. at 256−60 (describing contents of the ad).
87
Id. at 266 (“The publication here was not a ‘commercial’ advertisement in the sense
in which the word was used in Chrestensen.”).
88
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67−68 (1983).
89
Id. at 68 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
82
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below. However, the protection the Court offered to commercial speech was
based on these notions that the speech carried some “information” and that this
information was of relevance to the proper functioning of the market.
A. Advertising as “Information”

In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court essayed the following definition of
advertising’s function: “Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it
sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price.”90 In
the same opinion the Court suggested that commercial speech was speech that
does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.”91 This latter definition
may be a more general version of the first definition, but it still involves
characterizing the speech as informational. Similarly, the Court in Central
Hudson referred to the “informational function of advertising.”92 The
proponents of expanded protection for commercial speech also take the position
that advertising is information.93
This characterization of advertising as performing an informational
function crucial to the operation of the economy, progress, and perhaps even
democracy itself was the position taken by many of the persons, such as J.
Walter Thompson, George French, and Oscar Herzberg, who were some of the
founders of the advertising profession.94 Herzberg, the managing editor of
Printer’s Ink, the trade publication for the emergent advertising industry, wrote
in 1899 that advertising was one of the “great developments of the century,”95
“benefiting both seller and buyer by developing markets for the ‘hundreds of
improvements and articles by which life can be made more pleasant.’”96 In the
early part of the twentieth century, advertising’s promoters and practitioners
seemed to believe there was virtually no limit to the positive social goods that
could be attributed to advertising. By introducing products with which the
public had not previously been familiar, advertising could introduce better

90

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
765 (1976) (emphasis added).
91
Id. at 771 n.24 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) (striking down the segregation of want ads into “male”
and “female” categories)).
92
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980).
93
See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A
Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777 (1993); Alex
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627
(1990); Burt Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46
BROOK. L. REV. 437 (1980); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971).
94
See PAMELA WALKER LAIRD, ADVERTISING PROGRESS: AMERICAN BUSINESS AND THE
RISE OF CONSUMER MARKETING (1998).
95
Id. at 338.
96
Id.

LCB10.2_PIETY.DOC

2006]

5/17/2006 4:50:09 PM

FREE ADVERTISING & COMMERCIAL SPEECH

385

habits to the public and thus it could perform an “educational” function.97
Moreover, by stimulating desires, it stimulated the economy.98 Advertising, it
was argued, also improved competition and thus made business more
efficient.99
“[W]hen twentieth-century advertising practitioners and their advocates set
about attributing ‘civilizing and uplifting’ to advertising, they were quite in
earnest about it.”100 But even then criticisms about the effectiveness of
advertising, the potential for influencing the public in negative directions,
concerns about advertising’s effectiveness if it were seen to be untruthful, and
the advertisers’ willingness to exploit the “foibles” and “childishness”101 of the
public, suggested that the “information” provided by advertising was not
always necessarily beneficial to the public welfare. Nevertheless, the industry
continued on a largely optimistic self-evaluation. During the 1920s and 1930s
“ad creators . . . proudly proclaimed themselves missionaries of modernity.”102
Although the 1930s saw the rise of consumer advocacy that manifested
itself, among other ways, as truth-in-advertising and labeling regulation,103 the
faith that advertising’s function was largely beneficent and contributed to a
healthy economy continued to prevail. However, as the twentieth century
progressed, advertisers increasingly moved away from reliance on persuading
consumers through reasoning with them and presenting them with all the
“information” or “reason-why” advertising, and toward methods of persuasion
that stimulated emotional and unconscious reactions.104 Advertising that was
identifiable as a “pitch” came to be seen as less persuasive, part of the hard
sell.105 Instead, advertisers became interested in entertaining, in telling a story
so that the selling message could be received as a sort of by-product, albeit a
crucial one, of the ad. “[N]o one buys facts. They buy a story.” 106
This picture, gleaned from advertising and marketing professionals, is
much different than that proposed by the description of the “informational
function” of advertising the Supreme Court identified in Virginia Pharmacy—
speech that offers “information as to who is producing and selling what

97

Id. at 354−58.
Id.
99
Id. at 347−48, 354.
100
Id. at 355.
101
Id. at 370.
102
ROLAND MARCHAND, ADVERTISING THE AMERICAN DREAM: MAKING WAY FOR
MODERNITY 1920−1940 xxi (1985).
103
LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMER’S REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION
IN POSTWAR AMERICA 18−61 (2003).
104
RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 72–73 (2d
ed. 2005).
105
“Advertising is taken for it is—a biased message paid for by a company with a
selfish interest in what the consumer consumes.” RIES & RIES, supra note 2, at 5.
106
Seth Godin, The Storytellers, CMO MAG., June 1, 2005, available at
http://www.cmomagazine.com/read/060105/storytellers.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006)
(excerpt from SETH GODIN, ALL MARKETERS ARE LIARS (2005)).
98
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product, for what reason, and at what price”107 or speech that does “no more
than propose a commercial transaction.”108 The actual advertising environment
encompasses a much broader definition of information, much of it not, strictly
speaking, informational if one requires truth to be a foundational requirement
of what constitutes “information.”
But that does not make it untrue either. In many cases it makes no sense to
ask if an ad is “truthful” because it makes no claims. Much advertising is
directed at creating images. Advertising is as much about creating perceptions
as it is about conveying information. Indeed, with respect to the creation and
maintenance of a brand, it is almost entirely about creating perceptions,
perceptions that might not correspond to any “real” difference beyond the
brand identity itself.109 “There’s a cardinal rule about choices in the
marketplace that marketers often find difficult to accept: The physical
properties of the goods are important only to the degree that they affect
consumers’ perceptions!”110
B. Advertising as Product Differentiation Through Emotional and Visual Appeals

It is a fact of modern marketing that the marketing of a product consists of
far more than simply a communication of the nature of the goods and their
price, but includes the creation of all manner of associations, not all of them
overt sales pitches, such as product placements in movies. Nevertheless, all of
these activities are initiated with the intent of adding to the bottom line.111 That
is what makes them marketing. And much advertising doesn’t explicitly say
very much. Take, for example, Nike’s ad that appeared in the September 2004
issue of Vanity Fair. It is a six-page full color spread of track and field athlete
Marion Jones.112 The first page shows her face and no text. The remaining
pages contain the following text: “Crowd noise. Not wanting to see the back of
anyone’s [page break] head. A second skin more aerodynamic than your first.
A call from Jackie Joyner-Kersee. Relative humidity. Your name yelled from
the cheap seats. Not giving your [page break] rival the satisfaction of a ‘hello.’
You’re faster than you think.” 113
107
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 765 (1976) (emphasis added).
108
Id. at 771 n.24.
109
See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 643−46 & n.5 (1966)
(holding that the marketing effects that created a consumer perception of difference between
Borden milk marketed under its own label and that sold to be marketed under other private
labels did not create a cognizable difference pursuant to the jurisdictional requirements of
‘like grade and quality’ for purposes of Robinson-Patman Act).
110
ROBERT B. SETTLE & PAMELA L. ALRECK, WHY THEY BUY: AMERICAN CONSUMERS
INSIDE AND OUT 70 (1986) (emphasis in original omitted).
111
See La Fetra, supra note 7, at 1231−36 (describing various marketing techniques
that cannot be described as traditional advertising). Advertisers and marketers may not be
able to draw a straight line of cause and effect between a particular ad and sales, but all such
efforts are ultimately intended to generate positive economic results.
112
Ad on file with the author.
113
Id.
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It is not entirely clear what is to be conveyed by chopping up the sentences
across the pages (except maybe to keep one reading), but none of the text could
really be described as “informational.” Rather, the text seems to be intended to
inspire readers to identify with Ms. Jones, to imagine themselves as competitors
and to put themselves in her place. Of course the easiest and quickest way for a
reader to put herself in the place of the woman in the ad is to buy what she is
wearing. But a message that can be loosely translated as “Buy our athletic
shoes and clothing and you will be like (run as fast as?) Marion Jones”—if that
is indeed the message114—is one that is immune from regulation for its
misleading qualities because it would undoubtedly be categorized as mere
“puffery” that no sensible person would believe.115 And of course no one would
believe this message (or admit that they do). But as one advertising
professional puts it, “[t]he purpose of advertising is to create desire beyond
what the product can actually deliver.”116 Nike runs these ads because its
executives believe that such ads will motivate people to buy their product. How
they do so, or even whether they do so in fact, may be beside the point.
A glance at any newspaper or magazine or a few minutes spent watching
commercial television reveals that very little of what constitutes “traditional
product advertising,” that is, media products that are recognizable as ads, is
devoted to making explicit claims of any kind.117 This is one of the difficulties
with enforcing the existing regulation of commercial advertising; its “message”
is sufficiently ambiguous, vague, and impressionistic that it is fairly difficult to

114

As Professor Richard Craswell has noted, “different consumers draw different
inferences from the same commercial” and a single consumer may draw more than one bit of
information from the same phrase. Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65
B.U. L. REV. 657, 672 (1985).
115
See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Anti-Lock Brakes Prods. Liab. Litig., 966 F.
Supp. 1525 (E.D. Mo. 1997), aff’d, 172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1999) (consumers cannot
reasonably believe a test supports a claim that anti-lock brakes are 99% more effective).
“Simply stated, puffing is sales talk that the buyer should discount when making a
transaction because no reasonable person under the circumstances would rely on the
statement when contemplating a purchase.” Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 96-C1647, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10718, at *18−19 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1999), vacated by Tylka v. Gerber
Prods. Co., 211 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2000). For more on the puffing doctrine, see David A.
Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2006) available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=887720).
116
Diann Daniel, Real Beauty = Real Sales?, CMO MAG., available at
http://www.cmomagazine.com/read/current/real_beauty.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
117
The informational content may actually vary quite a bit depending on the type of
advertising. For example, classified advertising is entirely informational. Some ads, for
example diet products, may combine emotional appeals (photographs) with claims (Lose 10
lbs in 2 weeks!). And some ads, like the Nike ad discussed, may make no explicit claims at
all. Most information in traditional advertising, while subject to regulation, is also offered
with various hedges in the form of disclaimers (“results may vary”). In addition, the puffing
doctrine, low levels of funding and enforcement for the regulatory agencies involved,
volume of complaints, etc., are such that even where there is an explicit claim that is alleged
to be false, it is very likely that the advertiser will suffer no negative consequences as a
result. For a discussion of some of the techniques to avoid liability in the context of
testimonials, see The Problem with ‘True Stories,’ CONSUMER REPS., Jan. 2006, at 32−33.
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simply establish what it “says,” let alone to establish whether that claim,
assuming it isn’t found to be “puffing,” is truthful.118
If it is not making a claim what is it doing? Clearly there is an attempt to
generate sales. But the sale is at the end of a chain of associations and actions
generated by those thoughts which perhaps did not actually begin with the ad,
but are triggered by it. One element in this chain is the image or association that
the viewer is left with, the feeling about the product or manufacturer, as well as
how readily the name and look will be recalled at the time the buying decision
is made. This is what advertisers are seeking to affect. One of the principal
devices onto which these hopes are pinned is the brand.
It is hard to imagine a concept that is emptier of real content in some sense
and yet more significant to the manufacturer than the brand. Yet much
advertising appears to be directed at creating this brand “identity” rather than at
making any specific claims about product features, such as price, performance,
or quality, the claims the Court in Virginia Pharmacy seemed to imagine were
the usual content of advertising. Instead, much traditional advertising relates to
brand identity.
III. WHAT IS A BRAND?
A brand is a perception in the prospect’s mind.119

All sorts of things make up the image of a corporation that is then reflected
in the brand identity. According to authors from the Kellogg School of
Management at Northwestern, a brand is “‘a set of associations linked to a
name, mark, or symbol associated with a product or service—a brand is much
like a reputation.’”120 A company can itself be a brand, like Southwest Airlines,
Starbucks, or Nike. In other cases, a company is the repository of a number of
brand names, such as General Mills, which encompasses Old El Paso,
Wheaties, Cheerios, and Betty Crocker, among other brands.121. And
sometimes companies which house a number of related brands are themselves
owned by a larger parent company. Brands are protected by a variety of
devices, including trademarks and antitrust laws intended to prevent free riding
on a brand by the development of similar marks that capitalize on the
investments of competitors by using a similar mark or logo and hoping thereby
to benefit by customer confusion.122
118

Craswell, supra note 111, at 668−81.
RIES & RIES, supra note 2, at 85.
120
The Last Word, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 2005, at 99 (quoting from KELLOGG ON
BRANDING (Alice M. Tybout & Tim Calkins, eds., 2005)) (alteration of quoted material in
original).
121
See http://www.generalmills.com/corporate/brands/index.aspx (last visited May 6,
2006). Notice that some of these brands are for one product (Wheaties) while others make a
number of products under a particular label (Betty Crocker).
122
See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 827, 832 (2004) (“orthodox justification for protecting trademarks” involves
promoting market efficiency through reduced search costs for consumers, return on
119
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But what these logos and images evoke in customers is not precisely
informational. Rather it is often a feeling. “Consumers in the marketplace
operate on the basis of the psychological and social images of the goods they
buy.”123 “By pairing the brand name of the product with stimuli that naturally
elicit positive emotional responses from people, over many repetitions,
consumers learn to associate the brand with positive emotions. When they think
of the brand they’ll have good feelings about it.”124 According to a vice
president of marketing for Starbucks, “‘consumers don’t truly believe there’s a
huge difference between products,’ which is why brands must ‘establish
emotional ties’ with their customers through the ‘Starbucks Experience.’”125
“More and more of the currency of commerce is not goods, but
information and even brand-loyalty itself.”126 And the “information” referred to
is as much about the company and its practices as a whole as it is about the
product itself. Prada or Coach can charge the prices that they do in part because
what the consumer is buying is not just the materials and workmanship that
went into the product127 but the idea of the product, its social meaning.
As one marketing specialist puts it:
Today’s most successful brands don’t just provide marks of distinction
(identity) for product. Cult brands are beliefs. They have morals—
embody values. Cult brands stand up for things. They work hard; fight
for what is right. Cult brands supply our modern metaphysics, imbuing
the world with significance. We wear their meaning when we buy
Benetton. We eat their meaning when we spoon Ben & Jerry’s into our
mouths. . . . Brands function as complete meaning systems. They are
venues for the consumer (and employee) to publicly enact a distinctive
set of beliefs and values.128
investment in advertising and preventing free-riding by competitors). See also Elizabeth
Mensch & Alan Freeman, Efficiency and Image: Advertising as an Antitrust Issue, 1990
DUKE L.J. 321 (1990), regarding the controversy over the question of the alleged anticompetitive aspects of advertising and the move to regarding advertising and branding as
promoting economic efficiency.
123
SETTLE & ALRECK, supra note 110, at 128 (emphasis in original).
124
Id. at 107. The authors describe this as “classical conditioning,” a revealing allusion
to the genesis of these techniques in the experiments of Skinner and Pavlov. See id. at
107−08 (chart of “learning modes”: association, classical conditioning, operant conditioning,
modeling, and reasoning). That advertising is at least sometimes effective is hard to deny.
See Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 96-C1647, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10718, at *37–42
(N.D. Ill. July 1, 1999) (plaintiffs suing Gerber over what they alleged were false advertising
claims about the nutritional value of Gerber baby food couldn’t remember much about
Gerber’s product claims from the ads except the name and that they trusted it, with one
plaintiff testifying that when he thought of the name he got a “warm, fuzzy feeling”).
125
NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO 20 (1999).
126
Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687 (1999).
127
In fact it is not by any means the case that there is a reliable correlation between
price and quality of workmanship.
128
DOUGLAS ATKIN, THE CULTING OF BRANDS: WHEN CUSTOMERS BECOME TRUE
BELIEVERS 97 (2004). Although it might not be apparent from the title, the author is not
writing a cautionary tale about the pernicious effects of brands. He is a marketing specialist
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And a good deal of this social meaning is created by the advertising.
However, not all of the image or social meaning is created by the advertising
for the product. Much of it is created by what I call “free advertising,” that is,
public relations and other marketing efforts. “Advertising any given product is
only one part of branding’s grand plan, as are sponsorship and logo licensing.
Think of the brand as the core meaning of the modern corporation, and of the
advertisement as one vehicle used to convey that meaning to the world.”129
That “core meaning of the modern corporation” is often conveyed through
speech that relates to issues involving labor, the environment, animal testing,
and any number of other issues that may affect the market’s perception of the
company. And it is the whole market that is relevant—not just customers, but
investors, employees, government regulators—everyone.130 And of course
people aren’t neatly divided into one category or another. Categories overlap.
For example, many employees are also investors and customers.
Through what is known as “image advertising,” corporations attempt to
create impressions about the corporation itself, to give the corporation a
“personality” and create a “favorable attitude” toward the company.131 How
people feel about a corporation or a brand may be far more significant than
what they know. But what they feel is often created by what they think rather
than what they know. Some part of the image promotion takes place as public
relations and issue advertising, that is, advertising which takes a position on a
whose premise is that marketers can learn from the techniques that cults use to engender
loyalty to the cult to engender similar brand loyalty. As he puts it, “The position of this book
is that cults are a good thing, that cults are normal, and that people join them for very good
reasons.” Id. at xiv (emphasis in original). As with the Ries & Ries book, many of his case
studies are clients, leading to the suspicion that the book’s principal function is to market his
services. See RIES & RIES, supra note 2. Of course this observation may merely serve to
illustrate what some would describe as the edge of a slippery slope suggested by the
argument here. If the book is promotional, what stops the government from regulating the
content of books if promotional materials are commercial speech? The response is, I think,
that if by “regulation” we mean the provision of damages for detrimental reliance on
falsehoods, then such regulation already exists where the representations are sufficiently
concrete as to provide a basis for damages. There is no inevitability to prior restraints on
book publishers from the conclusion that false statements ought to be actionable in a
marketing context. This would distinguish the situation presented, for instance, by the
debacle surrounding the discovery that much of James Frey’s book, A Million Little Pieces,
touted by Oprah Winfrey and almost instantly achieving best seller status, was false. See,
e.g., Michael Granberry, ‘Pieces’ Fallout Continues, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 12, 2006.
While some readers may have felt hurt and misled, and Frey admits that he made up parts to
make the story more interesting (and thus presumably to sell more copies), he wasn’t, for
example, promoting any addiction treatment services. So if someone had entered treatment
upon reliance on his representations that turned out not to be true, he probably would not be
liable since he wasn’t benefiting from the provision of those treatment services or paid to
promote them.
129
KLEIN, supra note 125, at 5 (emphasis added).
130
Note that Atkin’s quote above supports this observation in that he references
“employees” as well as “consumers.” See ATKIN, supra note 128.
131
SHIMP, supra note 78, at 285 (quoting S. Prakash Sethi, Institutional/Image
Advertising and Idea/Issue Advertising as Marketing Tools: Some Public Policy Issues, 43 J.
MARKETING 68, 70 (1979)).
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current issue of public interest. “When using issue advertising, a company takes
a position on a controversial social issue of public importance with the
intention of swaying public opinion.”132 And everything for-profit corporations
say in the public sphere is presumptively related to the bottom line and related
to profitability concerns.133 That includes, for example, comments about labor
and environmental practices.
A. Corporate Image as a Part of Marketing

“Today, corporate advertising can be defined in terms of its purpose: to
establish, alter or maintain the corporation’s identity.”134 Image advertising is
intended to give a “personality” to a company. Thus, not only products, but
“entire corporations could themselves embody a meaning of their own.”135 In
this context then it seems to make sense to say a company is “radical,” “hip,”
“traditional,” or “responsible.” Bennetton, Abercrombie & Fitch, Brooks
Brothers, and Body Shop may each respectively be described as having a
personality that is “radical,” “hip,” “traditional,” or “responsible.” These are the
images these brands or companies136 have attempted to craft for themselves.
And image advertising directed at creating feelings about the company actually
works in both directions. That is, advertising meant to make the consumer “feel
good” about the parent corporation could make him or her simultaneously feel
good about its products or services.
Although there is no clear consensus on what constitutes corporate image
advertising it seems to have several facets, one part of which is sometimes
separated out as “issue” advertising.137 Issue advertising involves
representations about issues of public concern—the environment, labor
practices, animal testing practices, and the like. But this information is not
offered merely as a public service. As indicated above, it is offered because
companies disseminating it believe (or more accurately, their representatives
132

Id. at 286. A similar effort is described as “cause related marketing” where
companies form alliances “with nonprofit organizations to promote their mutual interests.
Companies wish to enhance their brands’ images and sales, whereas nonprofit partners
obtain additional funding by aligning their causes with corporate sponsors.” Id. at 581
(emphasis added).
133
See Greenwood, supra note 17. See also Bruce Ledewitz, Corporate Advertising’s
Democracy, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 389, 458 (2003) (arguing that commercial advertising’s
contribution to the so-called “marketplace of ideas” is distinctive because it is all aimed in
the same direction, toward consumption).
134
David Schumann, et al., Corporate Advertising In America: A Review of Published
Studies on Use, Measurement, and Effectiveness, 20 J. ADVERTISING 35, 37 (1991).
135
KLEIN, supra note 125, at 7.
136
For purposes of the consuming audience it often doesn’t matter if a brand is really a
free-standing company or part of a conglomerate. It is often part of the branding strategy to
keep the brand visible but not to brand the parent company, or to have separate brand
identities for subsidiary and parent.
137
See, e.g., C.C. Laura Lin, Corporate Image Advertising and the First Amendment,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 459, 462−67 (1988) (describing the multiple purposes of corporate image
advertising, all of which, despite the author’s observation regarding their mixed impact, have
a single aim—increasing corporate welfare, that is the company’s economic success).
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believe) that it will affect the bottom line. “Corporate image advertising is
directed at more than merely trying to make consumers feel good about a
company. Companies are increasingly using the image of their firms to enhance
sales and financial performance. Corporate advertising that does not contribute
to increased sales and profits is difficult to justify.”138 These practices are an
integral part of what the consumer sees as “the product” and contribute to what
they view as the corporation’s image. “Information about the relations of
production is as important as information about the performance features of the
objects of production.”139
B. Nike as a Case Study

For many years Nike has been criticized for its labor practices.140 Many
critics have accused Nike of subcontracting its manufacturing processes to
“sweatshops” in Southeast Asia. As a consequence an anti-Nike “no
sweatshops” grassroots campaign began on college campuses to question the
lucrative contracts that Nike has with college athletic teams to be “Nike
teams.”141 These contracts mean hundreds of thousands of dollars to the
colleges that sign them and provide Nike with what it apparently views as
important visibility and indeed even endorsements.142 Nike also has (or has
had) lucrative endorsement deals with prominent sports figures such as Michael
Jordan and Tiger Woods to wear its clothing and to do ads endorsing it.143
138

SHIMP, supra note 78, at 285−86 (emphasis added).
SUT JHALLY, THE CODES OF ADVERTISING: FETISHISM AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF MEANING IN THE CONSUMER SOCIETY 24 (1990).
140
For examples of some of the critiques of Nike, see Ronald K.L. Collins & David M.
Skover, Foreword: The Landmark Free-Speech Case That Wasn’t: The Nike v. Kasky Story,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 968−71 (2004). Interestingly enough, by 2005 Nike’s
reputation was almost completely resuscitated as it was listed 31st in Business Ethics’ 100
Best Companies for 2005. Business Ethics Magazine, What’s New, http://www.businessethics.com/whats_new/100best_2005.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
141
See, e.g., Global Exchange, About Global Exchange, http://www.globalexchange.or
g/about/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) (describing mission as including fighting
sweatshop labor conditions and specifically naming Nike); Just Do It!: The Nike Boycott
Spreads Across Alberta, http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/5232/ (last visited Feb.
28, 2006); Sweatshop Watch Newsletter, Summer 2001, Resources, http://www.sweatshop
watch.org/media/pdf/newsletters/7_2.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) (reporting on Global
Exchange’s Just Do It! proposed boycott of Nike). See also First Amended Complaint at
21−22, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., No. 994446 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jul. 2, 1998) (describing a
demonstration on February 22, 1997 in San Francisco protesting the opening of a Niketown
store).
142
First Amended Complaint, supra note 137, at 5−6. Of course, as it is increasingly
the case that both sides of the field are “Nike teams,” it may be less significant to endorse a
winner.
143
“Air Jordan”, named after basketball star Michael Jordan, is a sub-brand of Nike
footwear. See, e.g., Nikebiz, Air Jordan’s New Runway, http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/news/
pressrelease.jhtml?year=1999&month=03&letter=b (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). Nike named a
building after Tiger Woods. Nikebiz, Tiger Woods Christens State-of-the-Art Conference
Center on Nike World Campus (May 25, 2001), http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/news/pressre
lease.jhtml?year=2001&month=05&letter=l (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
139
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When criticism of its labor practices began to emerge, some of Nike’s athletic
stars were quoted as promising to “look into” the allegations about Nike and
sweatshops.144 So these grassroots campaigns combined with lots of negative
press meant Nike had to roll into action.
And roll it did. It launched an aggressive public relations campaign. It
hired Andrew Young to conduct a supposed fact-finding tour of its factories
and then commissioned a report from that tour, the positive points of which
found their way into press releases.145 Its employees wrote letters to the editor
confirming Nike’s commitment to fair labor practices.146 It drafted a “Code of
Conduct” and then issued press releases with a copy of the Code of Conduct
indicating that it made its subcontractors sign the Code and agree to be bound
by it. It issued press releases purporting to respond to the allegations.147 It
wrote letters making similar statements and commitments to college and
university presidents and athletic directors.148 And its chief executive, Phil
Knight, spoke publicly about Nike’s commitment to fair labor practices, an
adequate wage, and safe working conditions. He claimed that “you’ll find air
quality better [in our plants] than it is in Los Angeles.”149
There was just one problem. Allegedly many of these statements were
either misleading or simply not true. Marc Kasky, a citizen and activist in
California, filed a law suit claiming that Nike’s statements violated California’s
unfair trade practices and false advertising laws. He was not seeking damages
for himself. Rather he was suing under the then “private attorney general”
provision of the California false advertising and unfair competition statutes that
permitted any citizen to launch such claims on behalf of the public.150 Kasky
claimed that the above statements were made to boost the reputation of Nike, to
preserve its lucrative contractual arrangements, and ultimately, thereby, to
boost flagging sales. To the extent then that these statements were not true,
Kasky claimed they represented a fraud on the public. Nike categorized them as
free speech on issues of public concern, namely “globalization,” and filed a
demurrer to his complaint. Nike’s position was that if its customers were
concerned about such matters, they were concerned as a “moral” matter and
such moral matters were not subject to governmental purview. Nike claimed it
144
Kasky’s lawsuit alleged that Reggie White had called for Nike to relocate its
manufacturing in the U.S. and that Michael Jordan had indicated that he would “see it for
[him]self” about the conditions in Nike’s factories and if the working conditions were as
alleged by the critics Nike should “revise its situation.” First Amended Complaint, supra
note 137, at 7−8.
145
Id. at 21−24.
146
Id. at 10 (letter to the editor of Lee Weinstein, Nike’s Director of Communications);
Phillip H. Knight, Letter to the Editor, Nike Pays Good Wages to Foreign Workers, N.Y.
TIMES, Jun. 21, 1996, at A26.
147
First Amended Complaint, supra note 137, at 19.
148
Id. at 9−10. See also Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 685–86 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (appendix presenting one such letter).
149
First Amended Complaint, supra note 137, at 16.
150
It is surely no coincidence that California, after heavy corporate lobbying, passed
Proposition 64 which eliminated the private attorney general provision from the statute. See
Piety, Grounding Nike, supra note 8, at 195 n.256 (discussing Proposition 64).
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should have an absolute and unfettered right to say whatever it wished in this
context.151
But of course, as explored above, all of these matters, whether or not they
were “moral” concerns for consumers, were commercial concerns for Nike. It
is for these reasons that Nike’s claims about its labor practices, practices that go
into the manufacture of Nike clothing and shoes, are no less a “real” component
of the product than the brand name itself, which Nike spent close to a billion
dollars promoting in the year prior to the filing of the complaint in the Kasky
lawsuit.152 So it cannot be that when Nike issued press releases about its labor
practices it was not speaking to its “commercial” interests. Obviously it was.
That attitude is reflected in a letter to the editor by Nike’s Director of
Communication Lee Weinstein that was published in the San Francisco
Examiner:
Consumers are savvy and want to know that they support companies with
good products and practices. . . . During the shopping season, we
encourage shoppers to remember that NIKE is the industry’s leader in
improving factory conditions. Consider that Nike established the sporting
goods industry’s first code of conduct to ensure our workers know and
can exercise their rights.153
Of course it may not be saying much to claim to be the “industry leader” if
the industry’s practices are generally abysmal. And establishing a code of
conduct doesn’t mean enforcing it or distributing it to workers. These were the
sorts of objections, and more, that the Kasky lawsuit raised.
Kasky claimed that documents such as Weinstein’s letter to the editor were
performing a marketing function. The aim in publishing this letter, or a “Code
of Conduct,” was to improve the public perception of Nike’s practices, and
thereby consumer behavior, without actually having to do anything about
changing these practices. Because Nike knew consumers cared about these
issues, it wanted to assure them that it did too without actually having to incur
the costs that would be associated with making the changes that consumers
were seeking. The plaintiff, Kasky, claimed this constituted a fraud on
consumers. And if his allegations were true, it is difficult to understand why it
would not be a fraud on consumers.154 If the speaker knows and assumes that
such statements will influence consumer behavior and intends to influence
behavior through reliance on the statements’ truth, then it seems fraudulent to

151

I have characterized this elsewhere as asking for a right to lie. For a detailed
exploration of that claim and of the Nike case generally, see Piety, Grounding Nike, supra
note 8.
152
First Amended Complaint, supra note 137, at 5.
153
Id. at 10.
154
It cannot be over-emphasized that whether this is an accurate reflection of what the
letter said, whether the statements were true or false, etc., were all matters of fact which were
to be subject to proof and resolution at the trial and that Nike’s position, in filing a demurrer,
was that the truth didn’t matter. Nike claimed it was entitled to legal protection for these
statements even if it had made them with the intent to influence shoppers and with full
knowledge.
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make these statements where that information is untrue or misleading. As
Professor Douglas Kysar puts it:
Rather than being scientifically unfounded, nakedly protectionist, or
ethically inconsistent, consumer process preferences instead offer an
important vehicle through which individuals influence the world, express
their views on public issues, and fashion their moral identity in an era of
extraordinary interconnectedness, complexity, and dynamism in the
market. 155
This consumer concern for issues that Professor Kysar labels “process” should,
theoretically, be no less a part of product “quality” or “characteristics” than
whether a product is a “real” Prada bag or a knock off. Although Nike argued
that “no one contends that [its] statements misled consumers about the
characteristics of Nike products,”156 this is precisely what Kasky alleged
insofar as he argued that the “characteristic” at stake was whether Nike’s
products were the product of unfair labor practices and that Nike misled, or
intended to mislead, consumers on this point. Why should the company’s labor
practices be any less a “characteristic” of the product than its association with
Marion Jones?
Certainly labor practices are a characteristic that is of interest to many
consumers. And as Professor Kysar points out, it is one that appears to allow
consumers the feeling of meaningful participation in issues that contribute to
more than simply their own satisfaction.157 “[R]ather than waiting for postmarket wealth transfers and ameliorative environmental, health, and safety
regulations, consumers . . . instead express preferences for sustainable,
equitable outcomes through their market purchases ab initio.”158 However, their
ability to actually make such choices effectively depends on their ability to
receive accurate information on which to make such decisions. If the
information received is not reliable on the topics about which the public is
interested in basing their economic decisions, then those decisions are unlikely
to affect such practices. Indeed, even if such decisions are collectively
effective, if the companies successfully persuade consumers that they are not,
that the problem is “too big” to be addressed by their individual purchasing
decisions, it may discourage further attempts to effect real change through
consumption.
As noted above, the information regarding such issues as labor practices is
directly related to the corporation’s welfare. It is unclear why that welfare
should trump the desire by consumers for accurate information on these topics.
155

Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 624 (2004).
156
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No.
02-575) (emphasis added).
157
Professor Kysar notes that this other-directed component of consumption is one that
appears to contradict a “neoliberal view of the world” that focuses almost exclusively on
individual welfare maximization. See Kysar, supra note 155, at 635. See also COHEN, supra
note 100, at 388−97.
158
Kysar, supra note 155, at 636.
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[B]ecause corporations are entities whose decision makers owe fiduciary
duties to shareholders and owners, no responsible corporate spokesman
speaks on the company’s behalf without being concerned about the
effects the statements may have on corporate sales and profits. . . . [A]ll
corporate speech is, and should be, uttered in the interests of benefitting
the corporation in the eyes of potential consumers. . . .159

This was the argument offered by the various public relations professionals in
support of Nike. And it is consistent with the dominant legal theory of the
legitimacy of corporate action as described by professors Henry Hansmann and
Reinier Kraakman. “There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder
value.”160 It is hard to improve on the public relations professional’s own
statements about the nature of speech by corporations. However, the authors of
this quote in support of Nike seemed to think that aspect of corporate speech
strengthened the argument for protecting it rather than weakening it.
However, saying that there isn’t any corporate speech that isn’t calculated
to improve or protect long-term shareholder value is not the same thing as
saying that whatever the corporation says in aid of protecting shareholder value
is necessarily in the public interest. And it most certainly is not necessarily
information. If it is possible to assert that a corporation follows a particular
practice that the public finds laudable or attractive, but without assuming the
additional costs associated with following that practice, it would seem
axiomatic that a corporation not only would have an incentive to do so, it
would have a duty to do so. The only mechanism standing in the way of that
practice that would not only arguably preclude a corporation from engaging in
this sort of speech/practice, but provide it with a legitimate basis for declining
to do so, would seem to be a legal regime in which it could ultimately cost the
corporation more to fail to honor its public pledges than one in which it was the
better practice to avoid fulfilling them.
To be sure, the existence of a legal proscription for a particular practice is
no guarantee that the proscription will be observed where there is a strong
financial incentive to violate the law. The trade in illegal drugs flourishes, as
does corporate misconduct with regard to a variety of antitrust, securities, or
other regulatory matters.161 Still, unless we are prepared to concede that the
159
Brief for Arthur W. Page Soc’y et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra
note 17, at 18−19.
160
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001). For a thoughtful and thorough critique of what the authors call the
“meta-script” from which statements such as this emanate, see Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson,
The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2004).
161
See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Parke-Davis, Division of Warner-Lambert,
No. 96-11651-PBS (D. Mass. 2001) (alleging various violations of the criminal law related
to Warner-Lambert’s marketing of the drug Neurontin for off-label uses). Pursuant to a plea
agreement the company pled guilty to several of the charges “expressly and unequivocally
admit[ting] that it committed the crimes charged in the Information.” See Letter from
Michael J. Sullivan, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Robert B. Fiske & James P. Rouhandeh (May
13, 2004), available at http://news.findlaw/nytimes/docs/pfizer/usw51304plea.pdf. See
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criminal and civil regulatory regime is of no force in the corporate decisionmaking process, it would seem that the existence of a legal regime prohibiting
false statements for the purposes of boosting corporate image or sales or
responding to criticisms would represent some sort of reinforcement for the
behavior the government would like to encourage.
And there is some support for this observation in the post-litigation
conduct of Nike itself. Although Nike and many of its supporters ominously
opined that “news” sources would dry up in the face of potential liability162
because corporations would no longer be willing to issue press releases, in fact,
as predicted long ago by the Supreme Court in Virginia Pharmacy, it appears
that the robustness of the incentives to speak far outweigh the specter of
liability for misstatements163 because Nike has continued to make statements
about its labor practices and indeed has expanded its commentary despite the
fact that the objectionable California Supreme Court ruling is still, at this
printing, good law164 And Nike is not alone. It is now commonplace for
companies to issue social responsibility statements, to publicize their efforts to
engage in environmentally sound practices, to publicize benefits to employees,
and other process-related concerns that roughly fall into the category of
corporate social responsibility.
This practice is not without its critics. Many argue that there is little
consensus about what constitutes social responsibility and little in the way of
standardized measurements for assessing social responsibility, leaving
corporations somewhat adrift as to how to meaningfully contribute. Recently
The Economist saw fit to weigh in against the practice of corporate

United States v. Microsoft: Settlement Information, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/mssettle.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
162
See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 39 (indicating that Nike had declined to
participate in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and has turned down “dozens of
invitations . . . to speak on corporate responsibility issues” out of the fear of liability in
California should any of its statements be deemed false and misleading). See also Chris
Atkins, Where’s A Cop When You Need One? (2003), http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache
:U3wyYw8w16MJ:www.ketchum.com/DisplayWebPage/0,1003,1973,00.html+wheres+a+c
op+when+you+need+one&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1. Ketchum, a public relations firm,
suggests that the California Supreme Court’s decision in Kasky had implications that “could
be quite broad for anyone who makes a living in PR.”
163
“Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood
of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
164
See Jason A. Cade, If the Shoe Fits: Kasky v. Nike and Whether Corporate
Statements About Business Operations Should Be Deemed Commercial Speech, 70 BROOK.
L. REV. 247, 270 (2004) (“In spite of repeated threats to discontinue providing any
information about its factory conditions should it lose its litigation with California activist
Mark Kasky, Nike now provides more extensive information related to the working
conditions in its factories on its website that it did before the suit settled.”). Nike issued its
first Corporate Social responsibility statement in 2001. See Nikebiz, Nike Releases First
Corporate Responsibility Report (Oct. 9, 2001), http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/news/press
release.jhtml?year=2001&month=10&letter=e.
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responsibility as a legitimate corporate function on these very grounds.165 In
addition, the objection was made that managers aren’t really trained to engage
in social engineering. It is best to leave them to do what they do best—running
their businesses—and leave governmental functions to legislators.166
Presumably that criticism extends to advertising and publicity about corporate
social responsibility.
C. Advertising: From Economic Waste to Value Added

For a good part of the twentieth century, the consensus opinion among
economists, law makers, and legal scholars seemed to be that advertising
dollars that were directed primarily at product differentiation, that is, branding
such as identified above, particularly in the context of identical products, for
example, household bleach, represented an economic waste because it did not
relate any real information to consumers and was actually of negative value to
consumers since the expense generated by such product differentiation attempts
was passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. 167
Since there is no reason (save cheapness and availability) for a consumer
to prefer one brand of liquid bleach over another, there is no real need for
the various manufacturers to incur as heavy advertising expenses as they
do—except to protect their market shares . . . we have a situation in
which heavy advertising benefits the consumer, who pays for such
advertising in the form of a higher price for the product, not at all.168
The Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion with respect to whether the
Robinson-Patman Act prohibited price differentials between milk Borden sold
to be marketed as a house or “private” brand, and sales of the same milk under
the Borden label, where the only discernable differences in the product were
those associations created by the advertising. 169 The majority was of the
165

Editorial, The Good Company: A Skeptical Look at Corporate Responsibility, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 11 (criticizing much in the way of corporate social
responsibility as “pernicious benevolence”).
166
There is some good evidence that legislators are themselves contracting out their
responsibilities with regard to drafting legislation by accepting wholesale legislative
proposals from lobbying groups. See Wendy Higgins, Ghostwriting Legislation: The New
“Non-Profits” that Write Many State Laws (unpublished student manuscript, on file with
author) (describing the practice of lobbyists writing legislation that then is adopted verbatim
by legislators).
167
Mensch & Freeman, supra note 118, at 326−29 (quoting Commissioner Elman’s
opinion with respect to Clorox’s merger with Proctor & Gamble to the effect that since all
bleach was chemically identical and thus there were no rational reasons for advertising, from
the consumer information standpoint, except to protect market share on the basis of this
unreal difference, such advertising was wasteful, anticompetitive, and ultimately harmful to
consumers since it increased the price to consumers). See also Ralph S. Brown, Advertising
and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L. J. 1165, 1173 (1948)
(describing advertising directed at product differentiation for similar products as often
profitable for the companies involved but increasing costs and thus not involving
competition in the “economically useful sense of the word”).
168
In re Proctor & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1581−82 (1963) (emphasis added).
169
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 645−46 (1966).
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opinion that the “like grade or quality” test in the Act should not encompass the
expenditures made regarding brand differentiation or different consumer
attitudes created thereby.170 Justice White writing for the majority noted, “The
dissent would exempt the effective advertiser from the Act. We think Congress
intended to remit him to his defenses under the Act, including that of cost
justification.”171 And the enormous expenditures of the largest companies can
still be seen, practically if not legally, as economic barriers to entry for
competitors.172
However, in the seventies the consensus shifted, at least in some areas, to
the position that:
There is no way to distinguish qualities of a product attributable to image
alone (hence misleading and wasteful) from qualities attributable to
“real” difference—for example, lower price, better quality, or easier
availability. Given the impossibility of making that distinction – one
which necessarily entailed a normative judgment about the social value
of advertising—consumer “preference” as registered on the existing
market must prevail.173
That capitulation to the view that advertising “created” something has
always been somewhat controversial in that there was some suspicion that
empirical support was lacking for the association between the expenditure by a
corporation on advertising dollars and the receipt of something of value,
particularly increased sales attributable to those expenditures.174 “[C]hances are
that neither the client nor the [ad] agency will ever know very much about what
role the ad has played in sales or profits of the client, either short term or longterm.”175 Or as a running joke in the industry has it, “I know half of my
advertising money is being wasted. I just don’t know which half.”176 But one of
the reasons advanced for this problem of attribution of effectiveness is that
advertising lacks credibility. “Advertising has no credibility. Advertising is not
believable because consumers perceive it to be biased. Advertising is the voice
of the seller.”177 The solution? Put the advertising message in the hands of a
third party the public perceives as neutral—the media. “The essence of public
170

Id.
Id. at 645 n.6.
172
“[I]t is marketing investments like this one [Gatorade’s investments in its NFL
connection] that make it virtually impossible for Powerade or All-Sport to ever overtake the
sports-drink king of the NFL hill.” Id. at 227.
173
Id. at 337.
174
“The simple fact is that traditional advertising isn’t working very well.” RIES &
RIES, supra note 2, at 85. The authors devote an entire chapter in this book to reviewing case
studies of celebrated advertising campaigns that nevertheless did not generate sales. Id. at
49−59 (“Advertising and Sales”). See also SHIMP, supra note 78, at 228−29 (discussing
arguments for “disinvesting in advertising” relating to established brands). But see
Schumann, et al., supra note 134 (surveying published studies and concluding, with some
caveats, that corporate image and issue advertising had been “successful in encouraging
financially-related goals”).
175
SCHUDSON, supra note 1, at 85.
176
Id. (paraphrasing quote with various attributions).
177
RIES & RIES, supra note 2, at 75.
171
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relations is to verbalize the brand in a way that encourages the media to run
stories about the product or service.”178 “In light of how difficult it is now to
raise advertising awareness above the noise of so many competitive messages,
marketers are turning increasingly to product publicity as an important adjunct
to advertising.”179
IV. WHAT IS PUBLIC RELATIONS?

If one were to ask the man often dubbed “the father of public relations,”180
Edward L. Bernays, “What is public relations?” he would have said it is the
profession intended to facilitate communication. In his influential book,
Propaganda, Bernays noted:
If we accept public relations as a profession, we must also expect it to
have ideals and ethics. The ideal of the profession is a pragmatic one. It is
to make the producer, whether that producer be a legislature making laws
or a manufacturer making a commercial product, understand what the
public wants and to make the public understand the objectives of the
producer.181
In Bernays’ view, one of the chief features of democracy, modernity, and
industrialization in a country the size of the United States was that it was
necessary for society to be guided by what he called “the invisible
government.”182 “Propaganda,” he wrote, “is the executive arm of the invisible
government.”183 This invisible government was necessary according to Bernays
because, in order for the theory of competitive markets to work in the face of
the reality of a surfeit of information and a tendency for people therefore to
follow tastemakers, those “minorities” who actually acted as the governors
needed a device to “mold the mind of the masses [so] that they will throw their
newly gained strength in the desired direction.”184
178

Id. at 246.
FRASER P. SEITEL, THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS 228 (8th ed. 2001).
180
See, e.g., LARRY TYE, THE FATHER OF SPIN: EDWARD L. BERNAYS AND THE BIRTH OF
PUBLIC RELATIONS viii (1998) (“Edward Bernays almost single-handedly fashioned the craft
that has come to be called public relations.”).
181
EDWARD BERNAYS, PROPAGANDA 69 (Ig Publ’g 2005) (1928).
182
Id. at 47−48.
183
Id. at 48. Of course it may be the executive arm of the visible government as well.
Certainly the government has made liberal use of public relations techniques to get across its
“message.” See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Public Relations Campaign for Research Office at
E.P.A. May Include Ghostwritten Articles, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 18, 2005, at A16.
184
See BERNAYS, supra note 177, at 47. Even if he would not necessarily agree with
some of the ethical decisions of current practitioners, one cannot help but think Bernays
might have smiled in spite of himself had he read the following critique of the public
relations business. “The power of the PR industry is demonstrated not only by its hegemonic
manoeuvrings within and for every area of government and business, but also by its
remarkable ability to function as a virtually invisible ‘grey eminence’ behind the scenes,
gliding in and out of troubled situations with the ease of a Cardinal Richelieu and the
conscience of a mercenary.” JOYCE NELSON, SULTANS OF SLEAZE: PUBLIC RELATIONS AND
THE MEDIA 19 (1989).
179
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Although there was no PR industry as such at the time, the history of
public relations perhaps begins with Andrew Jackson’s notorious aide, Amos
Kendall, credited with being the first to engage in the news “leak” as well as
conducting many of the activities which today would be the job of the
president’s press secretary, and showman P.T. Barnum.185 Bernays and a
former Wall Street reporter, Ivy Ledbetter Lee,186 began the job of
professionalizing and formalizing the training and practice for the business that
came to be known as public relations.
Lee began his career assisting businesses to communicate following a
period of public criticisms of business from journalists who became known as
“muckrakers.” “For Lee, the key to business acceptance and understanding was
that The Public Be Informed.”187 According to his Declaration of Principles,
sent out to newspaper editors, his practice would be to communicate with the
press “frankly and openly” on behalf of his clients.188 However, his technique
did not rely entirely on sending out “frank and open” press releases and
responding honestly to press inquiries. It also involved touches of the showman
P.T. Barnum. Lee would arrange for press coverage of events intended to
“humanize” clients like the Rockefellers by offering the press human interest
and family angles to cover, showing “them in real-life situations such as
playing golf, attending church, and celebrating birthdays.”189
Today, public relations practice covers a range of activities that is so broad
that it is difficult to summarize. “[W]ell-worn tactics include calling a press
conference, pitching stories directly to journalists, arranging eye-catching
events, setting up interviews and handing out free samples.”190 Certainly a
feature of the practice is the crafting of press releases and the attempt to catch
the attention of the media to carry the “news” thus released as a story with the
byline of the reporter, thereby lending automatic credibility to a message that
might otherwise be dismissed as obviously biased. But public relations is far
more than press releases. It also involves scheduling activities that keep the
client in the posture of making news and spreading the message. So it includes
scheduling executives to appear on panels at conferences,191 before legislative
bodies, and on television and radio. Increasingly, it means preparing and
maintaining a website that is in effect an extended advertisement for the
company by providing information (although obviously principally that
information that will put the company in a positive light) as well as creating
opportunities, such as through contests and interactive features, to engage
visitors with its products or services in some way.
185

SEITEL, supra note 175, at 27−29.
Id. at 30. Seitel calls Ivy Lee “the real father of modern public relations.”
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 31.
190
Do We Have a Story for You!, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2006, at 57.
191
The author was recently on a panel at the University of Miami School of
Communications on March 31, 2006, for “Communications Week” about the Nike case
along with Vada Manager, a Nike employee.
186
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Public relations practice is also not limited to the for-profit sector. It is a
key part of governmental policy, albeit much criticized when it appears that a
story is all “spin” and no substance.192 But even in the for-profit sector, public
relations firms are deeply involved in lobbying and the apparently
indispensable job of conducting public opinion surveys. It is obvious why
companies perceive lobbying to be a good investment. Legislatures pass laws
that may directly influence the bottom line.193 It is often also the public
relations firm that may advise management of the advisability of expansion into
new markets or new lines on the basis of such surveys. They may coordinate
what have been dubbed “Astroturf campaigns” intended to influence legislation
which involve recruiting persons (sometimes with deceptive practices) to
participate in letter writing campaigns or other demonstrations which suggest
public support.194 Public relations practitioners may also craft “advertorials” for
traditional ad placement. They often have a role in creating non-profit research
or opinion organizations through which opinions favorable to the industry
client can be funneled without a direct connection to the client.
For many marketing professionals, public relations is a clear subset of
marketing efforts and ought to be driven by the marketing objectives of a
company—hence the term “integrated marketing communications,” or IMC.195
“In a 2004 review of the state of IMC, the authors concluded that, ‘IMC has
swept the world and become the accepted norm of businesses and apparently
the agencies that service their needs. . . .’”196 Not only is PR a key part of
marketing for the for-profit enterprise, according to influential PR writers Al

192

See, e.g., Stuart Elliot, A Undisclosed Paid Endorsement Ignites a Debate in the
Public Relations Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at C2 (reporting on disclosure that the
Department of Education paid conservative commentator Armstrong Williams $240,000 to
write columns supporting the Administration’s program No Child Left Behind); Frank Rich,
Enron: Patron Saint of Bush’s Fake News, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, § 2, at 1 (critiquing
the Bush administration’s screening of the audience in the Social Security program tour
“conversations” and discussing the administration’s payment of journalists through
lobbyists); Frank Rich, Op-Ed, One Step Closer to the Big Enchilada, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2005, Week in Review, at 12 (claiming the Bush administration engages in a practice of
creating an “alternate reality built on spin and outright lies”). See also Gia B. Lee,
Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005)
(critiquing governmental use of the public relations practice of attempting to influence policy
through planting news stories, influencing television drama scripts, influencing counseling
received from doctors, and other similar techniques as undermining the legitimacy of the
communications, and advocating greater transparency).
193
It is even better if you can write the law and get your version adopted by the
legislature. See Wendy Higgins, “Ghostwriting the Law”: Who’s Writing the Law Anyway?
(essay on file with author).
194
STAUBER & RAMPTON, supra note 29, at 79.
195
However, not all public relations professionals agree. Some argue that “PR includes
public affairs, issues management, crisis communication, community relations and employee
relations—all of which, I believe, are only marginally related to marketing.” Integrated
Marketing: Is it PR Nemesis or Salvation?, O’DWYER’S PR SERVICES REPORT (Jan. 1995).
This remark was made in 1995. Judging from current marketing literature, that battle has
largely been lost. See infra note 196.
196
Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 93.
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and Laura Ries, “PR is in the driver’s seat and should lead and direct a
marketing program.”197 Moreover, as noted in the title of this piece, “in
comparison with many other types of marketing, PR is cheap.”198 If you can get
the media to carry your message it is free. Furthermore, as Ries and Ries argue,
“[p]ublicity provides the credentials that create credibility in the
advertising.”199 “PR has credibility, advertising does not. People believe what
they read in newspapers or magazines or what they hear on the radio or see on
television.”200 They may believe it, but perhaps they should not.
The principal thrust of PR is to change the perception. As Ries and Ries
say, “perception is everything.” At the end of the day, the consequences to the
bottom line may be as beneficial (if not more beneficial) to the company that
manages to change the perceptions without changing the practices, as it would
be to change the practices as well as the perceptions. An example of the overt
use of this technique is the Nestlé corporation’s attempt to address its public
relations problems stemming from its sales of infant formula in the Third
World by initiating a campaign to set up a fund called “Carnation Care” to
benefit HIV-infected children.201 Its PR firm, Olgivy & Mather, proposed a
number of potential “feel good” campaigns to “inoculate” the company from
the negative ramifications that its practices regarding infant formula sales in the
Third World were generating before the “Carnation Care” campaign was
chosen.202 Unfortunately for Nestlé, the details of that campaign were leaked to
the press before it began, thus undermining the program’s potential
effectiveness.203 Of course whether it contributed to aid for HIV-infected
infants is not, in some sense, germane to whether its practices in selling infant
formula were acceptable. But it was clear the company hoped to be able to
change its image without changing its practices.204
But the discussion between the firm’s representatives and Nestlé’s
representatives illustrate some of the problem. It is not entirely clear that for the
practitioners of PR, acid rain, for example, is anything other than a PR
problem. The problem is the discipline may encourage a mindset that equates
improving the public perception of a problem with actually addressing the
problem. And of course, as explored above, this is partly because, from the
perspective of the client, the problem is the perception. So if it is possible to
cure the perception without incurring the additional expenditures that may be
associated with actually addressing the problem, there is a strong incentive to

197

RIES & RIES, supra note 2, at xii.
Do We Have a Story for You!, supra note 190, at 57.
199
REIS & RIES, supra note 2, at xix.
200
Id. at 85.
201
NELSON, supra note 184, at 13−15.
202
Id. at 14. The parade of proposals, including “Carnation Combats Cocaine,” would
be comical were it not for the seriousness of the issues and the distastefulness of using them
in this way.
203
Id.
204
After temporarily ceasing sales of infant formula in response to criticism, Nestlé
resumed the practice. Id. at 13.
198
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do so. That may encourage a mindset in which truth becomes irrelevant. That is
a problem—particularly when there is a crisis.
The public relations department is where clients turn when things go
wrong. The paradigmatic case is the response of Johnson & Johnson to the
poisoning deaths of consumers in Chicago in 1982 when it appeared that
persons unknown had tampered with some Tylenol by lacing it with cyanide.
The Johnson & Johnson case is often lauded as a textbook case of the
appropriate responsible corporate response to a crisis.205 However, according to
some, this version of the Johnson & Johnson response is itself an example of
PR at work because the Johnson & Johnson response was anything but
exemplary. Jack O’Dwyer, a public relations authority and publisher of a
newsletter for the profession, asserts that in fact Johnson & Johnson took eight
days to respond with a recall, less time than it took for the stores to remove the
product from their shelves.206 According to O’Dwyer, “J&J was just another
case of normal corporate foot-dragging during a crisis”207 and that PR
professors “have to ‘unteach’ the Tylenol episode because so many of their
students are ill-informed about it.”208 Perhaps it is the journalism students who
most need to be “untaught.”
In any event, crises continue to emerge, as of course they will—from the
Exxon Valdez spill209 to the General Motors and Goodyear tire issue, the Vioxx
recall210 to Wal-Mart labor practices211—the public relations people are often
the first responders. When that information is not accurate, the possibility for
harm seems obvious. But the harm is not limited to the response to isolated
crises. As discussed above, consumers care about and sometimes respond to
process issues. If they are misinformed on these process issues, then the market
is misled. The market relies on accurate information for its operation. The
consequences for misleading information skewing market responses can be
205
See SEITEL, supra note 179, at 42−47 (offering it as a case study of a responsible
corporate approach).
206
Jack O’Dwyer, PR Industry’s Amicus Brief [in Nike v. Kasky] Has a Flaw (Nov.
19, 2002), http://www.odwyerpr.com (accessible only to members), available at
http://reclaimdemocracy.org/nike/pr_brief_retort_kasky_nike.html.
207
Id. O’Dwyer’s very laudable purpose in publicizing this issue is to emphasize to the
profession and its clients that responses to a crisis need to be swift and substantive. Given
that we have ample evidence in the Tylenol case of the possibility of successfully selling the
public on the notion that a slow response actually was a swift one, O’Dwyer may be fighting
a losing battle. It would be beyond the scope of this Article to catalog the numerous similar
episodes in the political sphere in the last few years.
208
Id.
209
SEITEL, supra note 179, at 168−71 (Exxon Valdez as a case study).
210
Theresa Agovino, Merck Steps Up Public Relations Campaign After Recall,
CORPWATCH, Nov. 22, 2004, http://corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11. (public relations
campaign could be viewed as part of cover-up if claims that Vioxx was pulled from the
market as soon as the company knew of the problems with it that caused the deaths relating
to the lawsuits).
211
Michael Barbaro, A New Weapon for Wal-Mart: A War Room, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2005, at A1 (describing Wal-Mart’s press office set up to respond to stories and allegations
about Wal-Mart’s labor, environmental and other practices with “press releases, phone calls
to reporters and instant Web postings”).
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illustrated with two cases. These two cases are two of many more that might
illustrate the problem.
A. The Enron Story

By now the story of the spectacular rise and fall of the Houston energy
company, Enron, has been re-told many times.212 There were a number of
social, personal, and political factors that contributed to the debacle that was
Enron. However, the role played by publicity and the gullibility of the media
may not have been sufficiently appreciated. And while it may not be the case
that retaining the power to regulate corporate press releases for their truth, or at
least imposing liability when those releases contain information that is not true,
would necessarily have made any difference to the outcome in Enron, it surely
cannot be said that extending to these breathless issuances the mantle of First
Amendment protection would similarly be meaningless. Rather, it would seem
to be yet another obstacle for the government to overcome in either prosecuting
or restraining such conduct.
Many observers now say that the red flags were there to be seen in Enron’s
financial statements. “Enron’s principals abused the system in plain view,
taking advantage of the considerable slack it extends to successful actors.
Although they did not disclose everything, they disclosed more than enough to
put the system’s layers of monitors on notice that their earnings numbers were
soft and their liabilities understated.”213 Yet, for some reason, analysts, bankers
and the media were slow to read the signs of problems. “To the casual reader of
business weeklies, Enron was riding high at the turn of the 21st century.” 214
“Fortune Magazine hailed it as America’s most innovative firm for five years
running.”215 Worse, glowing media coverage and ready acceptance of Enron’s
officers’ self-assessment of the company turned out to be self-perpetuating. “In
retrospect, one wonders why Wall Street and the press were so willing—so
eager even to swallow the idea that Enron was reinventing corporate
culture.”216 But good press begets more good press. “The fundamental PR
strategy is to use a story in one publication and then move it up the ladder to
another publication. Or from one medium (print) to another medium (radio or
TV).”217

212

See, e.g., BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM:
THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003); Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Nancy
B. Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Skilling: How Enron’s Public Image Morphed from the Most
Innovative Company in the Fortune 500 to the Most Notorious Company Ever, in ENRON:
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds.,
2004); KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS: A TRUE STORY (2005).
213
William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1275, 1283 (2002).
214
Van Niel & Rapoport, supra note 212.
215
Bratton, supra note 213, at 1276.
216
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 212, at 121.
217
RIES & RIES, supra note 2, at 251.
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Enron even succeeded, through a campaign initiated by Andy Fastow and
adopted and pushed by Enron and CEO Ken Lay, to have CFO Magazine name
Fastow “CFO of the Year.” 218 The company prepared a “three-paragraph
letter”219 with “[a]n attachment that ran five pages”220 to support the case that
Andy Fastow should be CFO Magazine’s “CFO of the Year.” The project was
“under way for six months.”221 It worked. In 1999, CFO Magazine named
Fastow “CFO of the Year.”222 Surely such accolades were not irrelevant to the
general acceptance of Enron?
But, as indicated in the above discussion of public relations, the business
of promotion is not limited to getting good press coverage. It also includes
lobbying activities. “In 2000, Enron also paid $2.1 million to a dozen or so
Washington lobbying firms.”223 And the business of promotion includes staging
events, events that themselves will generate good press coverage or positive
reactions in the target audience. One of Enron’s primary target audiences was
the corps of market analysts whose reports are relied upon by investors,
investment banks, regulators, and the press. And here Enron pressed the
boundaries of promotion straight into fiction when it took analysts on a tour of
Enron Energy Service’s (EES) supposed “war room.”
There, they beheld the very picture of a sophisticated, booming
business: a big open room, bustling with people, all busily working the
telephones and hunched over computer terminals, seemingly cutting deals
and trading energy. Giant plasma screen displayed electronic maps,
which could show the sites of EES’s many contracts and prospects.
Commodity prices danced across an electronic ticker. ‘It was impressive,’
recalls analyst John Olson, who, at the time, covered the company for
Merrill Lynch.224 ‘It was a veritable beehive of activity.’
It was also a veritable sham. The war room had been rapidly fitted out
explicitly to impress the analysts. Though EES was then just gearing up,
Skilling and Pai had staged it all to convince their visitors that things
were already happening . . .. The analysts had no clue they’d been
hoodwinked.225

218

EICHENWALD, supra note 212, at 211 (Fastow proposes the idea to Mark Palmer,
Enron’s PR head).
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Russ Banham, The Finest in Finance: Andrew S. Fastow, Capital Structure
Management, CFO MAG., Oct. 1, 1999, at 62.
223
Bratton, supra note 213, at 1279.
224
Olson was later fired by Merrill Lynch for his failure to join the chorus of bullish
reports on Enron and his persistence in asking questions that Enron’s executives did not want
to answer. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 212, at 180. Of course, now Olson appears
prescient. But as noted above, many observers, including Olson, say the problems were all in
plain sight.
225
Id. at 179−80. See also Jason Leopold, Questioning the Books: Enron Executives
Helped to Create Fake Trading Room, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, at A4.
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Given this sort of coverage, lobbying, and promotional activities, it is not
surprising that the naysayers amongst those covering Enron, those responsible
for approving transactions, and assessing the firm’s viability, etc., found it
difficult to convince others. Indeed, there is the sense on the part of some
observers that key Enron players believed their own press and, worse, really did
believe that the key to performance was entirely in perception rather than
substance.226 Enron had successfully promoted itself.
It is possible to say that Enron’s crash proves that the market and the
marketplace for information works. But at what cost? Is there any question that
had the company not been permitted to engage in such showmanship, if it had
been clear that public relations statements could be tested for accuracy and
might expose the company to liability, that the lack of substance might have
been revealed sooner? Plenty of companies may engage in “cooking the
books.” Not all companies manage to simultaneously convince the public that
they are not only sound, but spectacular. At the very least, should it not be
crystal clear that even while some of these statements and acts may be
providing the basis for criminal liability under the current law, that if Nike and
other proponents of the proposition that public relations is political speech,227
that is, speech fully protected by the First Amendment, have their way, this
would not have a positive impact on the reliability of the information in the
market?
Enron’s collapse caused undeniable harm. But the connection of the harm
to the speech and promotional activities in question may be complex enough
that any cause and effect argument seems tenuous—despite what might be
widespread agreement that stunts like the Potemkin village of EES operations
are unethical. Tobacco presents a case in which the connection between the
harm and the speech appears more robust.

226
According to author Kurt Eichenwald, Mark Palmer, communications director for
Enron, had to battle CEO Ken Lay’s argument “that Enron’s troubles were just caused by
bad publicity, not by a flawed business model, not by a mismanaged balance sheet.”
EICHENWALD, supra note 212, at 852. Further evidence of this (or perhaps just evidence that
he is out of touch) was offered by Ken Lay’s speech to the Houston Forum on December 13,
2005, just months before his criminal trial was to begin in which he told the audience, “‘We
must create our own ‘wave of truth.’” Simon Romero, Enron’s Chief Offers His Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, at C1. Ordinarily, criminal defendants are cautioned not to make
speeches. Of course someone who is innocent might be more inclined to make such a
speech. This may also be true for those who want to opt for a “brazen-it-out” approach. Lay
clearly felt the evidence strongly supported him. But it is also likely to be ambiguous enough
that most lawyers would undoubtedly advise him not to take the risk. The trial began as this
Article was going to press, so Lay may yet be vindicated. But at the least his speech suggests
that he is out of touch with the potential consequences of that proceeding. So far as we
know, he has not yet taken a page out of Richard Scrushy’s book and used a PR firm to
actually pay a journalist for favorable coverage during his trial. Jay Reeves, Writer Says
Scrushy Paid for Favorable Copy, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 20, 2006, at E3.
227
Another way to get protection for this sort of speech and to insulate it from liability
would be to characterize it as “puffing.” See supra note 115. It might be a neater descriptive
fit as “puffery,” but the deleterious consequences of insulating the speech from liability
would be equally obvious.
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B. The Case Concerning Tobacco

Given the well documented negative health consequences of cigarette
smoking, consequences only marginally offset by any positive emotional or
other boosts, it is, from one perspective, a little remarkable that the product is
still legal to sell, let alone to promote.228 Still, one might reasonably think that a
governmental strategy to reduce consumption by reducing the demand
(whatever that might be) created by attractive promotional materials might be a
legitimate and sensible policy. Nevertheless, such attempts to regulate tobacco
advertising beyond the current limitations have, so far, met with little
success.229 However, the attorneys general of forty-four states successfully sued
tobacco manufacturers,230 and that suit resulted in a master settlement
agreement that contained numerous limitations on speech by these companies.
The tobacco companies were not to engage in sponsorship of events (with
limited exceptions).231 The companies could not pay for product placement,232
could not produce market branded merchandise,233 agreed to limits on
lobbying,234 and agreed to subsidize, on remaining billboard leases, antismoking outdoor advertising “intended to discourage the use of Tobacco
Products by Youth and their exposure to second-hand smoke.”235
These are just a few of the provisions of the Master Settlement, and the
agreement itself could serve as a primer on the variety of activities undertaken
to promote products. But one of the most interesting aspects, and relevant for
purposes of this discussion, was the agreement for the dissolution of the
Tobacco Institute, Inc., the Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A., Inc., and the
Center for Indoor Air Research, Inc., along with representations that no new
non-profits would be formed that would attempt to dispute the health
consequences of smoking and that any trade organizations formed would
operate under strict transparency rules. 236 What makes this interesting is that
228
Perhaps it is less curious considering that millions still smoke and that many
substances taken in excess can act as a poison. So perhaps it would be, all things considered,
undesirable to have the government declare tobacco illegal. Besides, repression as a strategy
has not worked very well. It did not work with alcohol during Prohibition. And, despite the
continuing resistance to legalization with respect to drugs, the war on drugs hasn’t been very
successful either.
229
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (Massachusetts statutes
attempting to regulate the outdoor advertising and point of sale advertising for non-cigarette
tobacco products struck down under Central Hudson test as overbroad and violative of First
Amendment; attempt to regulate cigarette advertising preempted by federal law).
230
See Tobacco Litigation Documents, available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacc
o/litigation/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
231
Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen., Multistate Settlement with Tobacco Industry at
13−14, available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/msa.pdf (last visited Feb.
28, 2006).
232
Id. at 15.
233
Id.
234
Id. at 17.
235
Id. at 14.
236
Id. at 19−21. The agreement purports not to “limit the exercise of any First
Amendment right,” Id. at 21. Some of these restrictions, particularly those relating to the
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ostensibly these organizations were not-for profit organizations whose whole
purpose was speech and the dissemination of research findings. Actually
though, they were PR “front” operations funded by the tobacco industry. Their
“speech” was simply attacking the promotional difficulties cigarette
manufacturers were experiencing as a result of the eventual publication of
studies demonstrating negative health consequences connected with tobacco
use by issuing counter studies and counter data to create the appearance of an
“issue.”
The role of these groups in delaying the general acceptance of the negative
data did not escape the United States government. And in 1999 it sued not only
the tobacco companies, but the Council for Tobacco Research-USA, Inc. and
the Tobacco Institute, as well, alleging a conspiracy by the defendant
companies and these two non-profit organizations to conceal or diminish
publication of evidence with regard to the risks of cigarette smoking.237 A key
component of the complaint alleged that the tobacco companies entered into a
“gentleman’s agreement” to obscure and obstruct the delivery of information to
the public about the true dangers of smoking by using the non-profit
organizations to disseminate information intended to obscure the true nature of
the addictive properties of nicotine and to diminish or downplay the role of
smoking in the development of cancer.238
The Complaint specifically identifies statements made by the Council and
the Tobacco Institute in which both organizations pledge that they have a
“responsibility to the public” to help explore the health consequences of
smoking, and that they were independent research organizations which were
undertaking to do so.239 The government alleged that these statements “were
false and misleading when made.”240 “From its inception, TIRC (later CTR)
was essentially a public relations organization designed to counter adverse
publicity concerning smoking and health, and not as an independent research
organization dedicated to getting to the bottom of the smoking and health
controversy.”241 If the format of this and similar press releases and advertorials
by the defendants were dispositive for purposes of determining the level of
First Amendment protection to be accorded to these statements, the government
would not have been able to pursue this prosecution because the defendants
would have had a First Amendment defense. Indeed they raised it. “Defendants
assert affirmative defenses that their innumerable public statements cannot
serve as a basis for liability or constitute violations of the mail and wire fraud

non-profits, would undoubtedly be unconstitutional had Nike’s definition of protected
speech been accepted by the Supreme Court in 2003, because the non-profits could point to
their non-profit status and the issue of the health consequences of smoking as “issues of
public concern.”
237
See First Amended Complaint at 2−3, United States v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 99-C
V-02496(GK) (D.C. Dist. 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/cases/tobacco2/.
238
Id. at 21−42.
239
Id. at 25−26.
240
Id. at 26.
241
Id.
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statutes because they were ‘good-faith’ expressions of opinion or belief and are
protected by the First Amendment.”242 It just wasn’t successful this time.
There is no question that the health consequences of smoking constitute
“issues of public concern.” But it seems equally clear that in such
circumstances a for-profit entity ought not to be able to immunize false
statements by claiming they are political speech on issues of public concern.
“[T]he labels that Defendants now attach to these statements–attempting to cast
the public communications as political speech, commercial speech, or
expressions of scientific opinion–are wholly irrelevant. False, misleading, or
deceptive speech in furtherance of a scheme to defraud receives no First
Amendment protection.”243 But this is exactly what proponents of broad
protection for commercial speech issued in the form of public relations would
authorize. For if it is completely protected, as Nike argued in the Kasky case,244
albeit in the civil context, then this would represent a serious obstacle to such
prosecutions. This Article proposes that such speech may fit comfortably into
the existing commercial speech framework and should be so interpreted, in
order to retain important governmental and social control over the negative
social consequences that may arise from a contrary finding.
V. A PROPOSED TEST

No test proposed can address all of the potential cases. However, a
working framework is offered by the California Supreme Court’s decision in
Kasky v. Nike and which I offer here with some additional suggestions for
distinguishing between commercial and protected speech in the category of
public relations speech. “[W]hen a court must decide whether particular speech
may be subjected to laws aimed at preventing false advertising or other forms
of commercial deception, categorizing a particular statement as commercial or
noncommercial speech requires consideration of three elements: the speaker,
the intended audience, and the content of the message.”245
A. The Speaker

In analyzing the speaker, the first most relevant question is whether it is a
commercial speaker. As the California Supreme Court noted, in commercial
speech cases the “speaker is likely to be someone engaged in commerce—that
is, generally, the production, distribution, or sale of good or services—or
someone acting on behalf of a person so engaged.”246 Of course this runs the
risk of simply re-framing the question without actually answering it. But
generally “commercial speech” is going to be issued from a for-profit business
242
See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Litigation Against Tobacco Companies, United States v.
Philip Morris, Inc., Civil Action No. 99-CV-02496(GK) (Jul. 1, 2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/cases/tobacco2/ (emphasis added).
243
Id. at 42−43 (emphasis added).
244
See Piety, Grounding Nike, supra note 8, at 192.
245
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 311 (Cal. 2002).
246
Id. (emphasis in original).
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enterprise. As the Supreme Court has noted on numerous occasions, the
existence of an economic motive is not dispositive. Authors don’t generally
write books for their own satisfaction. They hope to sell them. But typically
authors do not write books in order to sell something else.247 The product
authors are selling is the speech itself.
This distinguishes the case of the manufacturers of products which are
themselves speech products. A cogent case has been made out by Professor C.
Edwin Baker for carving out a similar exception for newspapers and other news
media.248 But by the same token this does not mean that non-profit status is
dispositive. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Supreme Court
had no trouble finding that a law aimed at for-profit corporations’ political
speech and the endorsement of candidates could be applied to a non-profit
organization where “more than three-quarters of the Chamber’s members are
business corporations.”249 Were the Court to adopt a rigid profit/not-for-profit
distinction, the Court noted, “[b]usiness corporations . . . could circumvent the
Act’s restrictions by funneling money through the Chamber’s general
treasury.”250 This is precisely what the government alleged the tobacco
companies did in the case of dissemination of “information” about smoking.
For purposes of applying the commercial speech doctrine, there is ample
precedent from which to draw that suggests that it is appropriate to distinguish
between commercial and non-commercial speakers,251 and that the designation
“commercial” be considered a factual question.
B. The Intended Audience

Although the obvious audience for commercial speech is consumers, it
was in part concern for the proper operation of the market, of which consumers
were a part, that prompted the Virginia Pharmacy Court’s concern about
protecting truthful information. Cases like Enron make clear that consumers are

247
Author Fay Weldon’s contract with Bulgari may represent an exception. See Calvin
Reid, Weldon’s Bulgari Product Placement Raises Eyebrows , PUBLISHERS WKLY., Sept. 10,
2001, available at http://www.publishersweekly.com/article/CA155440.html?pubdate=9%2
F10%2F2001&display=archive. But I would also note that some of the marketing, business,
self-help, and similar texts do seem to be authored with an eye to promoting the authors’
services in another sector. The Ries & Ries book, supra note 2, and the Atkin book, supra
note 128, seem to be drawn largely from case studies of their own clients and seem to
promote their services and their approach to existing and future clients.
248
See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 225−49 (1989)
(arguing for separate treatment of the press through the First Amendment on the basis of the
press clause, independent of the speech clause); BAKER, supra note 29, at 5 (arguing there is
a basis for protecting the press as a constitutive part of a democracy rather than as merely an
extension of the individual’s right of self-expression.).
249
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 664 (1990).
250
Id.
251
Id. at 662−64 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238 (1986), for the proposition that non-profits formed for “the express purpose of
promoting political ideas” and having a policy not to accept corporate contributions are
distinguishable from business corporations).
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not the only parties who influence the proper functioning of the market. The
California Supreme Court observed in Kasky that the “intended audience is
likely to be actual or potential buyers or customers of the speaker’s good or
services.”252 But it also noted that the intended audience could include “persons
acting for actual or potential buyers or customers, or persons (such as reporters
or reviewers) likely to repeat the message to or otherwise influence actual or
potential buyers or customers.”253 Such a test then encompasses analysts, as in
the Enron case, or college presidents and athletic directors in the Nike case, and
would not immunize statements simply because they were not directed at end
users.
C. Message Content

Finally, key to regulating in this area is that the court must be dealing with
material about which it is meaningful to regulate for whether it is truthful or is
instead false, deceptive, or misleading. Broad statements such as “We are a
Company That Cares” may not be actionable to the extent that the statement is
so vague, so capable of multiple interpretations, that the resolution is open to
dispute that cannot be resolved by examination of the facts.254 Of course it is
not the case that the facts will always speak for themselves in terms of
resolving a dispute. But clear-cut factual assertions, such as, “we pay our
employees minimum wage,” may be susceptible to proof and should not be
immunized as puff or opinion. Combined with the economic motivation of
stimulating sales or business, a limitation to factual assertions both imposes no
onerous burden and does not set up the government as arbiter of truth. The
California Supreme Court noted that such “representations of fact” would not
be limited to the company’s products or services, but could include “the
business operations” as well.255 Consumers care about all aspects of a
company’s conduct of its business operations and the rest of the relevant
market players do as well.
VI. CONCLUSION

Those entities seeking to profit from information injected into the stream
of commerce need to be accountable for the quality of that information. The
incentives for the information to be misleading and inaccurate are too great and
the consequences to the public too high for it to be in the public interest to issue
these companies a First Amendment blank check. Public relations statements
are issued in support of marketing and commercial objectives. For-profit
corporations have no other legitimate reason to issue such speech. There is no
reason why the public should subsidize them by not only ensuring that they can
252

Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 311 (Cal. 2002) (emphasis in original).
Id.
254
But it may still be possible that in context such a statement would be actionable if
sufficient factual support was offered for the proposition that the speaker intended a
particular interpretation that was not supported by the facts.
255
Kasky, 45 P.3d at 312.
253
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get “free advertising” in the context of public relations, but that there will be no
legal consequences for false speech. Given the relative paucity of explicit
claims in “traditional advertising,” claims which under current doctrine can be
tested for their truth, and the clear marketing and commercial relevance of
explicit claims made in the public relations context, far from being cut back,
the Supreme Court ought to make clear that the commercial speech doctrine
includes statements made in the public relations context.256 The Court should
reaffirm the commitment it made earlier in the doctrine’s genesis, that merely
inserting a matter of public interest will not immunize commercial statements
from regulatory scrutiny when the public is likely to be misled.257 It is still in
the interest of the proper functioning of the market that “the stream of
commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.”258

256

It seems clear that those concerned with advising corporations about these practices
do not rule out the possibility of liability stemming from public relations. See Andrea J.
Nordaune, Sales and Advertising: Keeping the Promises We Make, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 361, 369 (2000) (“Require that all communications that go outside the company go
through the formal review process [for accuracy] (television and radio commercials, print
advertising, sales and promotional brochures, catalogs, press releases, trade show exhibits
and distribution pieces, etc.”)); Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 99 (observing that the “most
important finding” of the California Kasky court was “that public relations expression is not
fully protected under the First Amendment as both conventional wisdom and some scholarly
studies have suggested.”) (emphasis in original).
257
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983).
258
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
772 (1976).

